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The paper investigates the usefulness of accounting comparability for audit engagement. 
Comparability among peer firms in the same industry reflects the similarity and the relatedness 
of firms’ operating environment and accounting reporting. From two perspectives of “inherent 
business risk” and “external information efficiency”, comparability is helpful for auditors to 
assess client business risk and lowers the cost of information acquisition, processing, and testing.  
For a given firm, I hypothesize that the availability of information about comparable firms is 
helpful for auditors by improving audit accuracy and audit efficiency.  The comparability proxy 
is based on a variety of measures including pair-wise earnings-return similarity (De Franco, 
Kothari and Verdi 2011), historical covariance of stock returns and cash flows, and earnings 
comparability controlling accounting choice differences.  The empirical results show that 
accounting comparability is positively associated with audit quality and audit reporting accuracy 
as of a clean or a going-concern opinion.  Meanwhile, comparability is negatively related to audit 
delay, audit fees, and the likelihood of auditor’s issuing a going-concern opinion.  In totality, the 
study shows that industry-wise comparability enhances the utility of accounting information for 











Given the costs of producing, auditing, and processing financial information, it is likely 
that comparability and consistency are desirable characteristics of financial reports (Kothari et al. 
2010). This paper examines the implications and benefits of accounting comparability for 
external auditing. Financial statements comparability among peer firms in the same industry 
reflects the similarity and the relatedness of firms‟ operating environment and financial reporting 
behaviors, and presumably helps lower the cost of information processing and testing, thus 
auditability is improved when a client firm‟s comparability is higher. This study aims to 
investigate whether accounting comparability is useful to auditors in terms of audit risk and audit 
outcomes.  
Comparability is defined as the quality of information that enables users to identify 
similarities in and differences between two sets of economic phenomena.
1
 If a firm‟s accounting 
amounts are more comparable with those of its industry peers, the marginal costs for outsiders 
(e.g., shareholders, creditors, and regulators) and for specialized monitors (e.g., independent 
auditors and financial analysts) to collect and process accounting information of these peer firms 
become smaller. As a result, they can evaluate the firm‟s true performance more accurately 
because the accounting information of comparable firms is a valuable additional input to analyze 
the business fundamentals of the firm in question. 
An individual firm‟s business operations are shaped by both firm-specific factors and 
industry common factors that affect all its peer firms. When common economic factors explain a 
                                                          
1
 In their conceptual framework for financial reporting, the FASB (2010) and IASB (IASB 2010) identified 
comparability as the qualitative characteristic of financial information that enables users to identify and understand 
similarities in, and differences among items. Despite the fact that accounting comparability is one important 
qualitative characteristics, the empirical research on it is relatively scarce. One reason is that it is a relative or 
comparative concept, not an absolute or independent criterion like other accounting characteristics (De Franco et al. 
2011). As a result, the empirical test for comparability has been intractable, especially for large sample of firms 




large amount of the similarity and/or dissimilarity of firms in an industry, these firms have higher 
comparability. Cognitively, it is difficult for individuals to evaluate information signals that are 
unique to a firm, and accordingly individuals tend to underweight idiosyncratic information in 
decision making (Slovic and MacPhillamy 1974; Lipe and Salterio 2000). A higher degree of 
accounting comparability lowers the cost of information acquisition, and increases the overall 
quantity and quality of information available to information users (De Franco et al. 2011).  Thus, 
comparability mitigates their dependence on information from management reports (Gong et al. 
2012). Taken together, comparability is an attribute that enhances the utility of financial 
statements. 
Industry-wise comparability may provide efficiency and knowledge spillovers achieved 
by a single firm in the audit engagement (Simunic 1984).  Information comparability contributes 
to the externality gains.
2
 Given the role of externalities in expanding auditors‟ available 
information set, the study of intra-industry information transfers in audit engagements provides 
additional insights into the economic benefits of audit accuracy and audit efficiency. Auditors 
could better understand how economic events translate into accounting performance for firms of 
a higher degree of accounting comparability. This enhanced knowledge facilitates the auditor‟s 
ability to attest the firm‟s accounting results and thus improves audit quality.  
Comparability of financial information also enriches an individual firm‟s information 
environment, which is beneficial for audit planning and risk assessment of client business. Risk 
measures assessed during the planning stage of an engagement are arguably subjective, whereas 
comparability is presumably helpful for auditor‟s actual perceptions of risk. In fact, the “halo 
effect” theory reveals that auditors‟ developing or inheriting high-level performance-related 
                                                          
2
 Financial reporting externalities occur when information about the operations of one firm conveys information 




judgments (strategic risk assessments) prior to evaluating more detailed performance measures 
(changes in account balances) will reduce their use of the diagnostic information contained in the 
more detailed measures (e.g., Murphy et al. 1993; Eilifsen et al. 2001; O‟Donnell and Schultz 
2005, among many others). Comparability facilitates the halo effect in reliability assessment. 
Conclusively, an analytical model of an individual auditee i‟s accounting comparability can be 
expressed as: Comparabilityi = Function(FirmRiskit, IndustryStructure1…i…J), i   [J]. J contains a 
group of comparable (or economically related) companies. A business entity‟s accounting 
comparability is due to firm-specific inherent risk and dynamic interactivities within peer firms 
in the same industry.    
Despite the potential importance of industry structure on the economic conduct of 
accounting firms, there is very little research at this level of analysis. Francis (2011, p.140) 
points out that “… we have barely scratched the surface in our understanding of the role that 
industry structure plays in audit quality”.  This paper is aimed to investigate whether this 
particular client characteristic (a client firm with a higher degree of industry-wise comparability) 
is an engagement-specific characteristic of audit risk and audit outcomes. 
The tests require empirical measures of pair-wise accounting comparability: The first and 
primary approach is using De Franco et al. (2011)‟s theoretical constructs of comparability based 
on the degree of earnings-return similarity among peer firms. I also use earnings comparability 
controlling for accounting choice heterogeneity (Cheng and Zhang 2011), the degree of 
comovement of stock returns for firm relatedness (Bhojraj and Lee 2002), and comovement of 
cash flows.  I examine how accounting comparability is associated with audit effort and 
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outcomes that are reflected by audit quality
3
, audit pricing, audit delay, audit report accuracy, 
and the auditor‟s propensity to issue a going-concern opinion. 
I anticipate that high accounting comparability is accommodating for audit tasks when 
engagement teams expand their comparative knowledge and skill sets, thus audit judgments 
could be improved. Hence, accounting comparability will lead to higher audit quality. 
Accounting comparability reflects the degree to which a client firm‟s business risk and the risk 
of auditability entail.  I conjecture that the association between accounting comparability and 
audit risk is negative.  Moreover, comparability also can help audit effectiveness (e.g., less 
redundancy of effort on information searching and attestation). As a result, it is negatively 
related to audit fees and audit report lag.  
Regressing audit metrics from Audit Analytics on the accounting comparability using a 
large sample of U.S. firms during 2000-2009 period, I find that accounting comparability is 
negatively associated with audit fees and audit delay (both indicating audit time and effort), and 
negatively associated with financial statement restatements. Empirical results further show that 
accounting comparability is negatively related to the likelihood of auditor‟s issuing a going-
concern opinion, suggesting that clients with higher accounting comparability face lower 
systematic business riskiness for receiving a going-concern audit opinion. In addition, 
comparability is positively related to audit quality (indicated by performance-matched abnormal 
current accruals) and to the reporting accuracy as rendering a clean or a going-concern audit 
opinion. The relation between audit reporting accuracy and comparability is more pronounced 
for new audit clients (for instance, audit tenure is no more than three years). Additional tests 
show that these findings are robust to the use of earnings comparability and firm relatedness 
                                                          
3
 The indirect audit outcome, audit quality, is indicated by earnings quality, such as discretionary accruals, following 
Becker et al. (1998); Francis and Krishnan (1999); and Geiger and North (2006), among many others.  
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variables, and to different specifications of regression models (e.g., the change in accounting 
comparability is significant in the audit fee / audit delay changes model). 
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, to my knowledge, this 
is the first paper to empirically study how accounting comparability is related to audit 
consequences. The results shed light on the role of comparability in the outcomes of audit 
engagement. In spite of its importance underscored by the FASB, comparability is under-
researched. Thus far, accounting comparability has been studied primarily from the viewpoint of 
accounting standards or methods (Sohn 2011). The paper expands the scope of accounting 
comparability research to auditing area. Understanding comparability is important because 
accounting comparability facilitates information transfer, and thus it should be beneficial for 
audit compliance and audit outcomes. 
Second, this paper argues that enhanced accounting comparability reduces the marginal 
costs for auditor to acquire and process comparable clients‟ accounting information. We have an 
impoverished understanding of the intrinsic quality of audit evidence (Francis 2011), and little is 
known about the reliability and relevance of audit evidence. Thus, it is extremely difficult for 
auditors to accurately assess the true audit risk. Comparability can be used to bridge the 
reliability and the relevance of evidences controllable by a client firm and those beyond the 
auditee‟s control (i.e., externalities). The effect of client industry structure is scarcely researched 
in auditing literature. The paper contributes from a new perspective of industry-setting 
information that is useful for auditability. 
Third, the study has practical implications for both auditors and client firms: Auditor 
enjoys the qualitative characteristics of comparability on the attestation process. With the aid of 
accounting comparability, audit judgment and decision-making improve, audit quality increases, 
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and risk of audit failure diminishes. The results also suggest that there is perhaps a demand for 
client firms to make their accounting information comparable. In other words, comparability will 
bring tangible benefits to firms in terms of auditability (for instance, timely and transparent 
financial report and audit report, and less audit fees paid). 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents background and relevant 
literature. Section 3 develops testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample and the 
measurements of accounting comparability and audit metrics. Section 5 outlines the research 
methodologies and examines the relation between accounting comparability and audit effort / 
outcomes. Section 6 describes alternative measures of research variables and a battery of 
robustness tests. Section 7 concludes. The Appendixes present variable descriptions and 
















2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The study links two streams of literature: research that has examined financial statement 
comparability and research that has studied the relationships between audit outcomes and 
accounting quality.  
2.1. The Framework of Accounting Comparability 
FASB states that “Our financial reporting system is essential to the efficient functioning 
of the economy. That is because it is the means by which investors, creditors, and others receive 
credible, transparent, and comparable financial information they rely on to make sound 
investment and credit decisions.”
4
 Specifically, the properties of GAAP as described in efficient 
contracting theory (e.g., comparability, consistency, verifiability, conservatism, auditability, etc.) 
suggest that the “institution” of GAAP helps mitigate both information asymmetry and agency 
problems in capital market transactions, thereby facilitating the long-run efficiency of the capital 
markets (Kothari et al. 2010). 
The importance of comparability has been underscored in GAAP. Accounting Principles 
Board Statement No.4 (1970) highlights that “the Board ranks comparability among the most 
important of the objectives of financial accounting...” (p.41). FASB Concepts Statement No.2 
(1980) defines comparability as “…the quality of information that enables users to identify 
similarities in and differences between two sets of economic phenomena” (p.9), and states that 
“investing and lending decisions essentially involve evaluations of alternative opportunities, and 
they cannot be made rationally if comparative information is not available” (p.40). 
Comparability is important as resource allocations necessitate comparisons among investment 
alternatives, indeed it facilitates efficient allocation (Revsine 1985).  
                                                          
4
 See FASB website http://www.fasb.org/facts/index.shtml 
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Comparability enables information users to identify and understand similarities in, and 
differences among accounting items. Occasionally, a single economic phenomenon can be 
faithfully represented in multiple ways, but permitting alternative accounting methods for the 
same economic phenomena diminishes comparability. The board then states that “comparability 
should not be confused with uniformity” and that “an overemphasis on uniformity may reduce 
comparability…”.  As FASB Concepts Statements No.8 makes clear that “Comparability is not 
uniformity.  For information to be comparable, like things must look alike and different things 
must look different” (para. QC23).  
Comparability, which includes consistency, is a secondary quality that interacts with 
relevance and reliability to contribute to the usefulness of information. GAAP allows that 
accounting rules represent common practice, and it does not preclude alternative practices that 
are likely to generate innovation in accounting. Comparability addresses comparing information 
among different entities while consistency addresses comparing information over time for the 
same entity.
5
 Like comparability, consistency is a quality of the relationship between two 
accounting numbers rather than a quality of the numbers themselves in the sense that relevance 
and reliability are. The consistent use of accounting methods is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition of comparability.  
Except that consistency contains the scope of comparability, Schipper and Vincent (2003) 
point out that defining financial reporting quality in terms of relevance, reliability, and 
comparability is empirically problematic if the intent is to separately assess these three attributes. 
Moreover, the identification and selection of comparable firms is a very difficult and time-
consuming process. The process is relatively subjective, requiring substantially professional 
                                                          
5
 Comparability between firms has always been problematic. Different firms may use different accounting principles 
making comparison among firms (even within the same industry) difficult at best (Schipper and Vincent 2003). 
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judgment. Therefore, Schipper and Vincent claim that evidence of a focus on reliability and 
comparability is visible only in “detailed implementation guidance”. 
2.2. Recent Empirical Studies of Accounting Comparability  
Recently empirical studies have emerged in response to the development of new 
methodologies to measure comparability, an output-based financial statements comparability 
developed by De Franco et al. (2011). A number of IFRS studies adopt De Franco et al.‟s 
measures (and/or modified ones) to examine whether accounting comparability has increased 
after the introduction of IFRS (e.g., Lang et al. 2010; Barth et al. 2011; Wu and Zhang 2011). In 
general, these studies document that the capital market benefits from global harmonization of 
accounting standards when accounting is more comparable. 
Another stream of more closely related research to this paper is the studies on the effect 
of accounting comparability using U.S. sample firms. Kini et al. (2009) report that, if analysts 
belong to a country where accounting regulation enforces firms to include more accounting items 
in their annual reports, their sector diversification increases. They reason that economic 
commonalities due to more comprehensive and comparable accounting across firms in a market 
enable an analyst to expend less time and effort to analyze other firms operating in the same 
market.  Their work shows that;  by focusing her attention on a set of firms within a market that 
are strongly influenced by a common set of economic forces, an analyst is able to harness 
economies of scale in the acquisition and production of information. These “scale economies can 
enable an analyst to either maintain a larger research portfolio or produce more accurate earnings 
forecasts by studying firms in greater depth” (p.871). 
Engelberg et al. (2010) examine the effect of geographic and industry proximity on the 
choice of institutional investors‟ portfolio structure and find that mutual fund managers are more 
10 
 
likely to hold other stocks in the same geography-industry cluster as the stocks in which they 
already have a large position. They reason that firms in the same industry and geography have 
more efficient market prices than firms outside clusters because their fundamentals such as 
investment and earnings strongly commove over time. This earnings comparability reduces the 
marginal cost of information acquisition for the institutional investors when they add new stocks 
to their portfolios.  
De Franco et al. (2011) investigate the effect of accounting comparability on analyst 
coverage and forecast properties and report that analyst coverage increases, forecast accuracy 
improves, and forecast dispersion diminishes when accounting comparability of the followed 
firms is higher. They argue that, for a given firm, the availability of information about 
comparable firms lowers the cost of acquiring information, and increases the overall quantity and 
quality of information available about the firm. Comparability also allows analysts to better 
explain firm‟s historical performance or to use information from comparable firms as additional 
inputs in their analyses.  
Cheng and Zhang (2011) examine the informativeness of earnings comparability (cross-
sectional earnings attribute) and earnings smoothness (time-series firm-specific earnings 
attribute). Earnings, if artificially smoothed, are not representationally faithful to the reporting 
entity‟s business model and its economic environment. If a firm‟s reported earnings deviate too 
much from its industry peers, the market could discount the smoothness. Common economic 
factors among firms in the same industry create comparability which eases the interpretation of a 
firm‟s earnings and enables investors to better understand the firm‟s operation. Earnings 
comparability potentially strengthens investors‟ confidence as they appear to assess reported 
earnings and to react more positively when earnings are comparable. They find that the 
11 
 
informativeness of earnings smoothness is contingent on the comparability of earnings to 
industry peers, in terms of contemporaneous earnings-return relation, the relation between 
current returns and future earnings, and cash flow forecast accuracy. 
Gong et al. (2012) investigate the effect of earnings synchronicity on management 
disclosure and document that managers are more likely to provide earnings forecasts when their 
firms‟ earnings synchronicity with other firms is lower. They posit that lower synchronicity 
means that the relative importance of firm-specific factors vis-à-vis industry common factors 
becomes higher in earnings determination, thereby increasing information acquisition costs for 
outside investors, which in turn increases information asymmetry between managers and 
outsiders. As a result, managers try to mitigate this asymmetry by disclosing more private 
information.  
2.3. Audit Outcomes 
Observable audit outcomes are sometimes direct, such as, auditor resignations and client 
disagreements with auditor (e.g., Form 8-K filing).
6
  Audit report is a final direct outcome; a 
company‟s financial statement is a joint product of the client and its auditor (Antle and Nalebuff 
1991). The audit outcomes also include its informativeness of audit report, auditor‟s opinion of 
going-concern issue, and an opinion on the effectiveness of the client‟s internal control over 
financial reporting. Indirect outcomes include financial statement quality and/or earnings quality 
since audit would constrain earnings management (e.g., Becker et al. 1998).
7
 There are also 
secondary effects of differential audit quality: Mansi et al. (2004) document that auditor quality 
and tenure are negatively and significantly related to the cost of debt financing, and in equity 
                                                          
6
 See papers by Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) and Shu (2000), among many others.  
7




markets Teoh and Wong (1993) conclude that larger auditors generate more value-relevant 
earnings information.   
Prior research has studied some factors related to audit outcomes. Mainly, these factors 
are auditor characteristics, engagement-specific characteristics, client characteristics, and 
institutions. Factors of auditor characteristics can be accounting firm size, brand name, industry 
expertise, and locale/unit of analysis (e.g., global, country, office, and partner).  Engagement-
specific characteristics are auditor independence, service fees (likely indicating client influence 
or economic bonding between client and auditor, as Larcker and Richardson (2004) argue), 
engagement tenure, auditor alumni, etc. Client characteristics include size, information 
environment, and corporate governance (e.g., audit committees). Institutional factors, such as 
regulatory agencies, litigation, and investor protection, also impact audit outcomes. 
2.4. Accounting Comparability and Auditability   
In response to changing business conditions over time and across auditees, auditors have 
increased the extent to which they consider business risk when they evaluate factors that could 
influence audit efficiency and accuracy.
8
  Integrating knowledge of business risk into materiality 
attestation can improve audit effectiveness by helping auditors develop a richer and more 
complete comprehension for the business processes that drive financial performance (Peecher et 
al. 2007). Procedures for assessing and incorporating business risk into the audit plan change the 
task structure that auditors use to learn about client operations and evaluate audit risk.  
Comparative financial information is useful for auditors to recognize similarities, 
differences and trends over time periods and across client businesses. Auditor can better 
                                                          
8
 Professional standards direct the auditor to „„obtain an understanding of the entity‟s objectives and strategies, and 
the related business risks that may result in material misstatement of the financial statements (International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 2008, ISA 315, 30).” ISA 315 asserts that „„[a]n understanding of business risks 
increases the likelihood of identifying risks of material misstatement (31).” In addition, it cautions that elevated 
business risk may increase the risk of intentional manipulation of financial statements. 
13 
 
understand how economic events translate into accounting results for her client(s) of a higher 
degree of accounting comparability, and this knowledge expansion facilitates the auditor‟ 
judgment and decision making (JDM) process in audit engagement. A positive side is that 
industry-wide comparability may provide efficiencies and knowledge spillovers achieved by a 
single firm in the audit engagement (e.g., Simunic 1984; Whisenant et al. 2003).  
Industry-wide comparative information helps auditors develop a holistic perspective on 
client operations before they become embroiled in firm-level condition. Before an auditor starts a 
new audit task from her client, if the client experiences similar underlying economic 
fundamentals over time (i.e., higher comparability) with her existing clients, then the auditor will 
be better off in her audit planning and processing. In fact, there is a “halo effect” on auditor 
judgment by influencing the reliability assessments that develop from independent evidence. 
Halo effect occurs when knowledge of an overall evaluative judgment changes the extent to 
which detailed evidence influences a decision because evidence consistent with the overall 
judgment has a greater impact on the decision than evidence inconsistent with the overall 
judgment (e.g., Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Balzer and Slusky 1992; O‟Donnell and Schultz 2005; 
Moroney and Carey 2011, among many others). 
During risk assessment, auditors who establish an initial judgment by learning about their 
client‟s business operation should develop a cognitive index with stronger links to knowledge 
about aggregate conditions that affect the viability of business processes and the quality of audit 
judgment and decision making. By shifting the focus of knowledge acquisition activities, the top-
down task structure should provide auditors with mental models that increase the salience of 
14 
 
conditions that determine business process performance and the integrity of management 
reporting (Schultz et al. 2010).
9
 
This study examines how accounting comparability affects the extent to which risk 
factors influence auditor judgment about the business risk of financial information. As illustrated 
in Figure 1, auditors must consider three types of risk factors when they evaluate the audit risk of 
their individual clients, including (1) industry-wide business conditions (i.e., common economic 
factors) that determine the effectiveness of processes that drive the business model, (2) entity-
level conditions of individual clients can increase the risk of faithful representation by 
management, and (3) account-level conditions involving patterns of fluctuations in accounting 

















Factors of Accounting Comparability that Influence Audit Risk Assessment 
 
Industry-wide information comparability helps auditors develop richer knowledge 
structures when they process individual client information. It essentially enhances the auditor‟s 
                                                          
9
 The top-down approach describes the auditor‟s sequential thought process in identifying risks and the controls to 













ability to achieve accurate results in the examination of a client‟s financial reporting (i.e., the 
auditability). Hence, I argue, from a broad sense, that this superior knowledge will improve 
decision performance by providing a more comprehensive and complete context for recognizing 






















3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. Timeliness of Audit Report 
Timeliness is an important qualitative attribute of financial statement, which requires the 
information to be made available to information users as rapidly as possible.
10
 The recognition 
that the length of audit may be the single most important determinant affecting the timing of 
financial reports (Givoly and Palmon 1982). The shorter the time between the end of the 
accounting year and the publication date, the greater the benefits that can be derived from the 
financial statements. The delay in releasing financial reports is most likely to increase 
uncertainty associated with the decisions made based on information contained in the financial 
statements. Both the empirical and analytical evidences reveal that the timeliness of financial 
statements has some repercussions on firm valuation (e.g., Beaver 1968; Givoly and Palmon 
1982; Chamber and Penman 1984; Kross and Schroeder 1984). Besides, as Bamber et al. (1993) 
argue, the delayed reporting may encourage certain unscrupulous investors to acquire costly 
private pre-disclosed information and exploit their private information at the cost of less 
informed investors.    
Ball et al. (2000) define timeliness as the extent to which current-period accounting 
income incorporates current-period economic income, the proxy for which is change in market 
value of stockholders‟ equity.  Accounting comparability captures the degree of similarity over 
time reflecting that common economic factors shape an individual firm‟s accounting income. 
That is to say, a firm‟s income, if comparable, generally deviates less from the firm‟s economic 
income.
11
 In fact, comparability is higher for firms in the same industry and for firms with 
                                                          
10
 FASB (1980) posits two fundamental qualitative characteristics, relevance and faithful representation. It also adds 
the enhancing characteristics of comparability, verifiability, timeliness, and understandability. 
11
 Information asymmetry creates a demand for accounting income with the property of observability independently 
of managers. Accounting income incorporates only the subset of available value-relevant information that is 
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similar market capitalization (De Franco et al. 2011). While this research design infers timeliness 
from the way the preparer and the auditor make the financial reports available to public, the 
paper reasons that comparability is an inherent characteristic of an individual company‟s 
business conditions, is reflective of economic income of the company, and should be informative 
in terms of timely reporting.   
Comparability, from another perspective of information efficiency for audit engagement, 
can help reduce redundancy in information searching and attestation. In other words, 
comparability is related to a reduction in collective effort by auditor, as a consequence, more 
timely audit report (proxy by audit delay, it is measured as the number of calendar days from 
fiscal year-end to the date of the auditor‟s report). The functionality of comparability for 
information efficiency will translate into audit efficiency. Determinants of timeliness of audit 
reports are interesting since audit delay affects the timeliness of both the annual earnings 
information release and the Form 10-K filing date. Understanding the (client-related) 
determinants of audit delays may provide some insights into audit efficiency (e.g., Bamber et al. 
1993; and Ettredge et al. 2000; among many others). I propose that information comparability 
contributes to information efficiency for audit work. My first hypothesis is as followed:  
H1: Accounting comparability is positively (negatively) associated with the timeliness of 
audit report (the audit delay).   
 
3.2. Audit Pricing 
Studies document that auditor pricing is a function of auditor effort and perceived audit 
risk (e.g., Simunic 1980; Palmrose 1988; Simunic and Stein 1996; Seetharaman et al. 2002). 
Audit fees are indeed related to the effort of auditor corresponding to the level of audit risk, a 
function of audit complexity which affects the amount of effort expended on the audit 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
independently observable, whereas economic income incorporates information that is not independent of managers, 
such as plans and forecasts (Ball et al. 2000). 
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production. Due to business complexity, auditor will charge a higher fee as the required effort to 
effectively audit the client increases. Some studies use abnormal audit fees to test for auditor 
independence (e.g., Larcker and Richardson 2004). An abnormal fee is the residual or 
unexplained audit fee from a standard audit fee model, the idea being that the unexplained fee 
provides a measure of economic bonding between the auditor and client. However, Francis 
(2011) argues that abnormal audit fees may capture abnormally high audit effort or auditor‟s 
pricing (unobserved) of client risk characteristics.  
Prior research (e.g., Antle et al. 2006) shows a negative relation between the level of fees 
(both audit and non-audit) paid to auditors and accruals (i.e., higher fees are associated with 
smaller accruals). Cheng and Zhang (2011) document a negative correlation between accounting 
comparability and the level of total accruals and discretionary accruals as well. Kim et al. (2010) 
find that mandatory IFRS adoption has led to an increase in audit fees, and that the IFRS-related 
audit fee premium increases with the extent of comparable accounting between a country‟s 
former local accounting standards and the IFRS.  
Research has argued that when auditors provide both audit and non-audit services, scope 
of economies arise because auditors can gain from the spillovers of knowledge from auditing to 
consulting, and vice versa. Krishnan and Yu (2011) find a strong and significant negative 
relationship between audit fees and non-audit fees. Their results suggest that knowledge spillover 
flows from non-audit to the audit side, as well as from the audit side to the non-audit side. 
However, Wu (2006) concludes that there is no empirical evidence for such knowledge-spillover 
benefits on audit pricing from studies of auditor costs and hours (cost savings).
12
   
                                                          
12
 The two papers by Wu (2006) Krishnan and Yu (2011) are based on the knowledge-spillover effect from a single 
client where an auditor provides multiple services (auditing and non-auditing service within the same client). The 
knowledge spillover in this study is pointed at the industry-wide cross-firm phenomenon.    
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Industry-setting comparability reflects a positive externality gain for auditors. Moreover, 
comparability indicates the degree to which common economic factors shape an individual 
client‟s business environment and financial reporting, thus high comparability reflects low 
systematic business risk. I propose that a higher degree of accounting comparability indicates 
low level of business risk which induces less audit effort necessary, and at the same time, 
comparability facilitates information transfer for audit production by saving time and cost of 
information acquisition and attestation. Auditing firms would less price the decreased audit risk 
and effort into their fees. My second hypothesis is as followed:  
H2: Ceteris paribus, accounting comparability is negatively related to audit fees.  
3.3. Audit Quality 
Audit quality is not directly observable. Hence prior studies have used a variety of 
measures as proxies for audit quality, e.g., restatement as a measure of audit quality (Srinivasan 
2005; Dao et al. 2012). Comparing audit outcomes between classes of auditors is also to proxy 
for audit quality. On average, Big-N audits are of better quality (e.g., Francis and Krishnan 1999; 
Weber and Willenborg 2003). An industry specialist, in addition to a brand name, is known to 
offer a higher level of assurance than does a non-specialist (e.g., O‟Keefe et al. 1994; Craswell et 
al. 1995; Beasley and Petroni 2001; Owhoso et al. 2002; Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan 2003; 
Reichelt and Wang 2010).  
An extensive branch of audit differentiation research focuses on the quality of the client‟s 
financial statements, in which discretionary accruals are often used as a proxy for audit quality, 
as they reflect the auditor‟s constraint over management‟s reporting decisions. Becker et al. 
(1998) indicate that high-quality audits decrease earnings management (i.e., managers‟ 
intentional reporting bias), and Watkins et al. (2004) suggest that unintentional measurement 
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errors could be reduced by high-quality audits. Using Greek sample firms, Caramanis and 
Lennox (2008) measure audit quality by actual engagement hours and show that client earnings 
quality is higher when auditors exert more effort. Gunny and Zhang (2009) also document a 
direct link between audit quality and the quality of client earnings based on the PCAOB reports. 
Khurana and Raman (2004) suggest that investors‟ perception of financial reporting quality (as 
captured in ex ante cost of equity) increases with perceived audit quality.
13
  
Recently, researchers have examined the effect of financial statement comparability on 
client‟s earnings quality. Gong et al. (2012) posit that low earnings comparability indicates 
management‟s relative information advantage over outsiders, whereas higher comparability 
attenuates information asymmetry between insiders and uninformed investors. Therefore, when a 
firm‟s earnings are largely determined by non-comparable firm-specific factors, corporate 
outsiders incur greater costs (either more time or more effort or both) to discover and process a 
firm‟s idiosyncratic information, and uninformed outsiders will face greater difficulty in 
evaluating the truthfulness of reported earnings. In explaining the validity of their measure of 
accounting comparability, De Franco et al. (2011) document that comparability is positively 
related to accruals quality, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness, and negatively 
related to earnings loss. Cheng and Zhang (2011) focus on earnings comparability controlling 
accounting choice heterogeneity, they document that earnings comparability is positively 
correlated with cash flow comovement, earnings smoothness, and earnings persistence, and 
negatively correlated with abnormal accruals. Sohn (2011) reveals that managers‟ real earnings 
management increases whereas their accrual-based earnings management decreases with the 
degree of their firms‟ accounting comparability with peer firms. 
                                                          
13
 The studies by Callen et al. (2011) and Lawrence et al. (2011) also use ex ante cost of capital as a proxy to capture 




Comparability can be viewed from a network perspective. Increasing the number of firms 
with directly comparable financial reports increases the number of two-way communication 
linkages in the “financial reporting” network (Meeks and Swann 2008), which enhances the 
value of the overall network to both management and outsiders. Consistent with the network 
perspective, one firm‟s adoption of more comparable reporting practices creates externalities on 
other firms (Hail et al. 2009). Nevertheless, Beyer and Sridhar (2006) counter-argue that, in the 
presence of limited wealth for the audit firm, the addition of a second client can decrease audit 
quality and increase the likelihood of audit failure relative to a single-client setting. 
Information comparability across clients enables auditor to assess one client‟s relative 
financial position and performance among other clients. Comparability over time is necessary for 
the identification of misstatements in a client firm‟s financial compliance and reporting. With the 
aid of comparative information, auditor can systematically detect irregularities and errors in 
company‟s financial recording practices, the transparency of the company, and the forthrightness 
of the managers who interact with the auditor. In view of that, I posit that if a client‟s accounting 
comparability is high, audit accuracy is enhanced when auditors assess and attest the client‟s 
earnings information and reporting model, thus leading to higher audit quality. My third 
hypothesis is as followed:  
H3: Accounting comparability is positively related to audit quality.  
 
3.4. Auditor’s Going-Concern Opinion 
The going-concern assessment is a matter of auditors‟ professional judgment. Prior 
research has investigated audit quality with the auditor‟s greater propensity to issue a going-
concern audit opinion (GCAO). The notion that higher-quality auditors are more likely to issue a 
GCAO has been well established in the literature. Extant research suggests that larger auditors 
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(Weber and Willenborg 2003), larger audit fees (Geiger and Rama 2003), and national and/or 
office-level industry expertise (Lim and Tan 2008; Reichelt and Wang 2010), are positively 
associated with an auditor‟s propensity to issue a GCAO. Lennox (1999) uses the going-concern 
/ client failure framework in a different way to measure auditor reporting accuracy. Auditors 
report accurately if client failures are preceded by a GCAO and if clients that do not fail receive 
a clean opinion.  In this paper I move beyond the traditional definition of a high-quality auditor, 
and investigate whether the effect of enhanced knowledge spillover and/or an inherent business 
risk is related to the likelihood of auditor‟s issuing a going-concern report.  
During the last decade, large accounting firms adopt new audit approaches often referred 
to as business risk auditing which are based on a top-down, holistic perspective of the client, and 
encourage the auditor to develop a thorough understanding of a client‟s business and related 
business risks (Bell et al. 2005; Knechel et al. 2007). The business risk approach forces an 
auditor to determine the extent to which the client‟s strategic objectives are being met (or not) 
and to assess the likelihood that the client will succeed in the future. Several recent studies 
indicate that under certain conditions the business risk audit methodology may lead to greater 
audit effectiveness and efficiency (e.g., Erickson and Mayhew 2000; Choy and King, 2005; 
Kopp and O‟Donnell 2005).  However, Bruynseels et al. (2011) document that audit firms using 
a business risk methodology are less likely to issue a going-concern opinion for a firm that 
subsequently goes bankrupt.
14
 They further conclude that there is no evidence supporting that 
business risk auditors are more likely to issue a going-concern opinion for companies that 
subsequently go bankrupt.  
                                                          
14
 Bruynseels et al. (2011) use a sample of U.S. companies from manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39) that went 
bankrupt from 1998 to 2001. 
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Risk assessment typically starts with a strategic analysis of the client (Bruynseels et al. 
2011). This assessment comprises an analysis of the industry within which the client is operating, 
the client‟s strategy to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage, the business risks that 
threaten the success of this strategy, and the client‟s responses to these risks. The knowledge 
gained from industry-based experience can be applied to unfamiliar tasks set within a familiar 
industry context (Moroney and Carey 2011). As such, comparability helps auditor gain a 
thorough understanding of the adequacy and feasibility of the company‟s strategy in light of the 
external business environment and client internal processes and resources. 
The above research views the enhanced industry knowledge from the side of business 
risk auditor, while this paper view the implication of accounting comparability as client‟s 
inherent business risk to auditor. I argue that comparative information is useful for a thorough 
analysis of the client‟s business and could potentially decrease the likelihood of audit reporting 
errors because it may enhance auditors‟ ability to recognize going-concern problems.  
Even the fact that the likelihood to issue a going-concern opinion is deemed as quality 
audit and accounting comparability is presumably associated with higher quality of audit, the 
going-concern opinion is in essence the auditor‟s opinion of client risk of continued operation 
more than the quality of audit.  Client risk encompasses audit risk faced by auditors, 
nevertheless, client risk is independent from audit risk which diminishes when auditors comply 
with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and render a clean or a going-concern 
opinion, when and wherever appropriate.  
From a financial statement user‟s point of view, bankruptcies without a prior going-
concern report are often viewed as audit reporting failures (McKeown et al. 1991). Geiger and 
Raghunandan (2001) show that the proportion of bankruptcy companies that receive a going-
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concern audit opinion in the year immediately preceding bankruptcy is less than 50%.  Recent 
research indicates that strategic information about a client can have a significant impact in the 
likelihood that an auditor issues a GCAO (e.g., Behn et al. 2001; Geiger and Rama 2003).  I 
hypothesize that comparative information has a positive impact on auditor reporting accuracy. 
Comparability can help detect potential deception regarding the true economic conditions of the 
client.  
Moreover, since accounting comparability indicates the degree to which common 
economic factors shape an individual client‟s business environment and financial reporting, a 
higher degree of comparability should reflect low systematic business risk, specifically, the risk 
of a client‟s ability to continue functioning as a business entity. Therefore, auditor will be less 
likely to issue a going-concern opinion for a client with a higher degree of accounting 
comparability. More importantly, comparability helps auditors accurately evaluate client‟s 
going-concern situation. In my fourth hypothesis, I jointly test the following:  
H4a: An auditor is less likely to issue a going-concern report when the client‟s 
accounting comparability is higher, ceteris paribus.   
 
H4b: Accounting comparability is positively related to auditor‟s reporting accuracy, if 


















4. DATA AND MEASUREMENTS 
4.1. Measures of Accounting Comparability 
FASB [1980] states that, “comparability is the quality of information that enables users to 
identify similarities and differences between two sets of economic phenomena.”  I add structure 
to this idea by defining the accounting system as a translation of economic events into financial 
statements. De Franco, Kothari and Verdi (2011, hereafter as DKV) use stock returns as a proxy 
for the net effect of economic events on the firm‟s financial statements. These economic events 
could be unique to the firm but could also be due to industry- or economy-wide shocks. The 
proxy for financial statements is earnings. While earnings are certainly one important summary 
income statement measure, I acknowledge that using only earnings to capture financial statement 
comparability is a limitation of the analysis. For each firm-year I first estimate the following 
equation using the 16 previous quarters of data: 
                                                                                                                       (4-1) 
where:  
 
The “closeness” of the functions between two firms represents the comparability between 
the firms. To estimate the distance between functions, i.e., a measure of closeness or 
comparability, I invoke the implication of accounting comparability: if two firms have 
experienced the same set of economic events, the more comparable the accounting between the 
firms, the more similar their financial statements. I use firm i‟s and firm j‟s estimated accounting 
functions to predict their earnings, assuming that they had the same return (i.e., if they had 
Earn = The ratio of quarterly net income before extraordinary items to the beginning-
of-period market value of equity; 
Return = The stock price return during the quarter. 
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experienced the same economic events, Returnit). Specifically, I use the two estimated 
accounting functions for each firm with the economic events of a single firm. I calculate:  
                     ̂   ̂                                                                                                 (4-2) 
                     ̂   ̂                                                                                                 (4-3) 
E(Earn)iit is the predicted earnings of firm i given firm i‟s function and firm i‟s return in period t; 
and E(Earn)ijt is the predicted earnings of firm j given firm j‟s function and firm i‟s return in 
period t. By using firm i‟s return in both predictions, I explicitly hold the economic events 
constant. I define accounting comparability between firms i and j (       
    ) as the negative 
value of the average absolute difference between the predicted earnings using firm i‟s and j‟s 
functions: 
                    
      
 
  
 ∑                        
 
                                                   (4-4) 
Greater values indicate greater accounting comparability. I estimate accounting 
comparability for each firm i – firm j combination for J firms within the same SIC two-digit 
industry classification and whose fiscal year ends in March, June, September, or December.
15
 In 
addition to the i – j measure of comparability, I also produce a firm-year measure of accounting 
comparability by aggregating the firm i – firm j        
     for a given firm i. Investors may 
select a few closely comparable firms in the same industry when assessing comparability, in 
which considering more firms simply adds noise (Cooper and Cordeiro 2008). Specifically, after 
estimating accounting comparability for each firm i – firm j combination, I rank all the J values 
                                                          
15
 Following De Franco et al. (2011), I exclude holding firms. Compustat contains financial statements for both the 
parent and subsidiary company, and I want to avoid matching two such firms. I exclude ADRs and limited 
partnerships because the focus is on corporations domiciled in the United States. Specifically if the word Holding, 
Group, ADR, or LP (and associated variations of these words) appear in the firm name on Compustat, the firm is 
excluded. I also exclude firms with names that are highly similar to each other using an algorithm that matches five-
or-more-letter words in the firm names, but avoids matching on generic words such as “hotels”, “foods”, 
“semiconductor”, etc.   
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of        
    for each firm i from the highest to lowest.       
  is the average        
    of the 
five firms j with the highest comparability to firm i during period t. 
4.2. Measures of Earnings Comparability and Cash Flow Comparability  
DKV (2011) develop a measure of accounting comparability, in which firms whose 
economic events are correlated will have correlated financial statements over time when their 
accounting is similar.
16
 Their output-based measure of comparability is derived from the strength 
of the historical covariance between a firm‟s earnings and the earnings of other firms in the same 
industry, as evidenced by the R
2
 values. Therefore, earnings comparability is based on the 
covariation between a firm‟s earnings and earnings of its peers.
17
  I extend DKV‟s construct by 
controlling for accounting choice heterogeneity (Christie and Zimmerman 1994; DeFond and 
Hung 2003) as accounting differences reduce the comparability of earnings, assuming that 
pairwise earnings difference is partially resulting from accounting choices. I estimate equation 
(4-5) for each firm i and firm j pair (i ≠ j), j = 1 to J, within the same two-digit SIC industry: 
                                                                                                      (4-5) 
                                        
                                                                                                                         (4-6) 
where: 
NI = Annual net income before extraordinary items, scaled by prior-year total assets; 
CFO = Annual cash flows from operations less cash flows from extraordinary items, 
following the approach in Hribar and Collins (2002), scaled by prior-year total 
assets; 
                                                          
16
 They further argue that accounting earnings could fulfill a comparability role to investors even when the 
accounting functions per se are not identical. 
17
 Other researchers have studied the selection of comparable firms to examine valuation methods. For instance, 
Bhojraj and Lee (2002) use stock return co-movement as a way to measure economic relatedness among firms as a 
way to select comparable firms. Alford (1992) selects comparable firms on the basis of industry, size, and earnings 




ACH = Accounting choice heterogeneity. 
 
Accounting choice heterogeneity (ACH) is an index ranging from 0 to 1 that captures the 
comparability of a firm‟s accounting choice with its industry peers. The index is computed by 
assigning a value of one to each firm whose accounting choice differs from the most frequently 
chosen method in that firm‟s industry group, for each of the following five accounting choices: 
(1) inventory valuation; (2) investment tax credit; (3) depreciation; (4) successful-efforts vs. full-
cost for companies with extraction activities; and (5) purchase vs. pooling.
18
 I use a rolling 
window of six years of data to estimate equation (4-5) for each firm i and j combination. I 
remove observations in which NIi is more than three standard deviations away from the mean 
value of the six annual observations of NIi.  
After obtaining the R
2
 from estimating equation (4-5) for each firm i–firm j combination, 
I rank all J-1 numbers of R
2
s for each firm i from the highest to the lowest. The firm with the 
highest R
2
 is considered to be the most comparable firm with firm i, and its earnings are the most 
likely to be affected by the same common economic factors as the earnings of firm i. One 
measure of earnings comparability that I use,       
    , is the mean R
2
 for all firm Js (j = 1 to J, 
i ≠ j) in the industry. However, investors may select a few closely comparable firms in the same 
industry when assessing comparability, in which considering more firms simply adds noise 
(Cooper and Cordeiro 2008). Therefore, I also calculate another measure of earnings 
comparability,       
  , using the average R
2
 for the five firm Js with the highest R
2
s. In either 
                                                          
18
 Following Christie and Zimmerman (1994) and DeFond and Hung (2003), I use Compustat data to identify each 
firm‟s accounting choices. I use the following Compustat data and footnotes sources: inventory valuation method 
(data item 59), investment tax credit method (footnote 8), depreciation method (footnote 15), property, plant and 
equipment (footnote 31), and acquisition method (footnote 37). If a firm has no information or a missing value for a 
given accounting choice, the choice is coded as zero (consistent with the firm selecting the most common 
accounting choice in the industry). The score for each firm is summed, and then scaled by the number of accounting 
choices in the industry: 5 for firms in the petroleum and natural gas industry (because they are eligible for all 5 
choices); 3 for firms in banking, insurance, real estate, and trading industries (because they have no inventory choice 
and are not extractive industries); and 4 for firms in all other industries (because they are not extractive industries). 
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case, the higher the value of       
    or       
  , the more comparable a firm‟s earnings are. 
Similarly, I use annual estimates of equation (4-6) to obtain cash flow comparability (      
    
or       
  ).  
Other commonly-used comparability variables are based primarily on “closeness” to a 
cross-sectional level based on contemporaneous measures (e.g., return on equity, firm size, or 
price multiples) measured at a single point in time (e.g., Alford 1992; Joos and Lang 1994; Land 
and Lang 2002). In contrast, this measure of earnings comparability captures similarities over 
time and is firm-specific. Besides, the comparability measures are calculated absent from the 
effects of other earnings attributes, such as earnings smoothness and persistence, which are 
calculated independently of the performance of other firms. 
4.3. Measure of Economic Relatedness 
I proxy for the similarity in economic shocks by developing return comparability 
variables, measured analogously to cash flow comparability. Bhojraj et al. (2003), for instance, 
use covariance in stock return as a way to measure economic relatedness among firms. Hameed 
et al. (2010) examine information spillover as a source of stock return synchronicity, where 
information about highly-followed “prominent” stocks is used to price other “neglected” stocks 
sharing a common fundamental component.  They find that stocks followed by few analysts co-
move significantly with firm-specific fluctuations in the prices of highly followed stocks in the 
same industry, but do not observe the converse. This reasoning suggests that Merton‟s (1987) 
model might be usefully supplemented by considering information spillovers, where investors 
use information about one stock to price another that is likely affected by similar fundamentals. 
I propose that the three most important fundamental variables that affect the audit-
outcome proxies and also influence the differences between auditor groups are the client‟s 
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industry, size, and performance. To match on these dimensions, for a given fiscal year-end, 
industry (defined by two-digit SIC code), and size distance (firms that are within a size distance 
of 50 percent), firm i is matched to firm j with the most comparable performance, measuring 
performance as stock returns‟ covariance over the preceding 48 months, where higher covariance 
indicates higher comparability.
19
 As per the De Franco et al. (2011) methodology, I measure 
returns covariance using the adjusted R
2
 of the following regression of firm i‟s monthly returns 
on firm j‟s monthly returns:  
                                                                                                                   (4-7) 
In addition, I require matched firms to have their fiscal year-end on the same month to 
reduce differences from timing in financial reporting. Allowing for 50 percent distance in total 
assets results in more than one potential control for every treatment observation, and the final 
selection among all possible controls is based on returns‟ covariance. This procedure is likely to 
closely match peer-firms deemed economically comparable by the market. Compared to other 
matching approaches, it does not rely on a specific functional form to predict comparability, 
beyond a return covariance structure, and can be used not only in case-control research settings, 
but also in situations where a company needs to be matched with its economic peers;  for 
example, to form benchmark groups for valuation or to perform analytical audit procedures.  
In equation (4-7), Comp
RET
 is computed in a manner that parallels the construction of 
Comp
CFO
.  Instead of CFO in equation (4-6), I use monthly stock returns taken from the CRSP 
Monthly Stock File, and instead of 16 quarters I use 48 months. Comp
RET
 captures covariation in 
economic shocks related to cash flow expectations over long horizons.  
 
                                                          
19
 As noted by Chan et  al. (2007,  p.57), “if equity market participants consider a set of companies closely related, 
then shocks in the group of stocks should experience coincident movements in their stock returns.” 
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4.4. Proxies for Audit Quality  
Extant studies in a variety of contexts have used client discretionary accruals as the proxy 
for audit quality (e.g., Becker et al. 1998; DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Francis and 
Krishnan 1999). Following this line of research, I use performance-matched discretionary 
accruals as a primary proxy for audit quality.  I follow the same approach as in Geiger and North 
(2006), who examine accruals quality after the hiring of a new Chief Financial Officer. 
Following Geiger and North (2006),  I estimate abnormal current accruals by using the cross-
sectional version of the Jones (1991) model introduced by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). I 
estimate the following model by two-digit SIC industry and by year:  
     
     
      
 
     
   
               
     
                                                               (4-8) 
where: 
TCAit = Firm i‟s total current accruals in year t measured as = (ΔCAit ‒ ΔCLit  ‒ 
ΔCashit + ΔSTDEBTit);   
ΔCAit = Change in current assets for firm i from year t-1 to year t; 
ΔCLit = Change in current liabilities for firm i from year t-1 to year t; 
ΔCashit = Change in cash and short term investment for firm i from year t-1 to year t; 
ΔSTDEBTit = Change in current portion of long-term liabilities for firm i from year t-1 to 
year t; 
Ait = Total assets of firm i for year t-1;   
ΔREVit = Change in revenues for firm i from year t-1 to year t; 
ΔRECit = Change in receivables for firm i from year t-1 to year t. 
 
The residuals from the industry and year-specific regressions using equation (4-8) are a 
measure of abnormal current accruals (ACA).  I then adjust ACAit for performance matching 
following the approach used by Francis et al. (2005).  I form performance decile groups by 
industry based on the current year‟s ROA (income before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets).  I estimate performance-matched abnormal current accruals (PMACAit) as the difference 
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between ACAit and median ACA for the ROA decile to which firm i belongs (where the median is 
calculated excluding firm i). 
4.5. Sample Selection  
My sample period covers from 2000 to 2009.
20
  I exclude ADRs, closed-end funds, and 
REITs, firms with negative assets, market price, or sales, and firms without the necessary data to 
calculate the control variables in the main regression models (for example, imposing all the 
necessary requirements to calculate the discretionary accruals regression variables). For 
accounting comparability measures, I begin all U.S. public firms (with share code 10 or 11) that 
are at the intersection of the CRSP monthly returns file with Fundq quarterly data. This results in 
a full sample consisting of 42,158 firm-year observations.  From Audit Analytics for all the 
auditing variables, I first exclude firms with unidentified auditors (auditor coded as 0 and 9). The 
combined comparability data and audit data has 20,884 firm-year observations.  I then run simple 
OLS regression of the full sample with all the interest variables and exclude the output data with 
the absolute value of studentized residual greater than 3 to remove the undue influence of 
outliers.  The final sample includes 20,750 firm-year observations with 6,423 individual firms.  
Table 1 delineates the detailed sample selection procedures. The initial sample consists of 
104,796 firm-year observations for U.S. firms from 1995 to 2010, with sufficient data available 
on Compustat. I employ the following sample selection criteria: I remove 1) 25,393 observations 
with negative assets / sales / yearend stock price; 2) 913 observations with missing cash flows in 
fiscal year of 2010; 3) 2,725 observations are not in CRSP return file or not common shares. I 
obtain 44,589 observations of accounting comparability, and then intersect with various variables 
in selected Compustat dataset and with Audit Analytics data. I remove 21,274 observations not 
                                                          
20
 To select the sample for empirical tests I collect non-missing observations for Compustat firms incorporated in the 
U.S. with the data from 1995-2010 as I need cash flow volatility variable that is calculated based on prior six-year 
data and the following year cash flow variable. 
33 
 
intersected with Audit Analytics, and/or with unidentified auditor, and/or missing observations 
of industry specialist auditor. I also drop 134 outlier observations with studentized value greater 
than 2. The final sample, spanning from 2000 to 2009, has 20,750 firm-year observations with 






Criteria  # of Observations  
Firm-year observations for U.S. firms from Compustat between 





Firms with negative assets / sale revenues / yearend stock price 25,303 
Firms with no operating cash flows in 2010 913 
Firms are not public firms with share code (10 or 11) and not 
intersected with CRSP return file  
2,725 
Firms with missing accounting comparability 33,697 
Firms not intersected with Audit Analytics dataset, with 
unidentified auditor (auditor key: 0 or 9 ) and missing indicator 
variable of joint city and national industry specialist auditor 
following Reichelt and Wang (2010) 
21,274 
With extreme outliers (absolute value of studentized residuals  
greater than 3) 
134 
Final sample during fiscal year 2000-2009 for main tests  20,750   










4.6.      Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables. The mean and median of 
accounting comparability (Comp
Acct
) is -3.955 and -3.260 respectively, suggesting that the 
average error in quarterly earnings between firm i and firm j functions is 3.96% of market value. 
The mean value for earnings comparability (Comp
Earn
) is 0.197, suggesting that on average firm 
j‟s earnings explain 20% of firm i‟s earnings. On average, 83.7% of the sample firms are audited 
by Big-N auditors and 17.7% of firms are audited by joint national and city industry specialist 
auditor (SPEC). The mean (median) of audit delay (Delay), the square root of the number of 
calendar days from fiscal yearend to the date of the auditor report is, 6.925 (6.782), respectively.  
The average (median) of audit fees (FEE) in the natural logarithm format is 13.285 (13.254), 
respectively. The average client importance (CI) is 0.111, indicating that around a given client‟s 
market share consists of 11% of the market shares of all the clients audited by a given auditor. 
3.3% of the client firms under study receive a going-concern audit opinion from their auditor, 
and 14% of firms undergo financial statement restatements.  
All variables (except the dummy variables, firm age, and audit tenure) are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% percentiles each year. The descriptive statistics is based on a sample size of 
20,750 during the period of 2000-2009 for all variables except implied cost of capital measure 
(ICC) that has 19,856 observations over the same time period. Refer to the Appendix I for 










Variable Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Comp
Acct
  -3.955 2.950 -4.410 -3.260 -2.311 
Comp
Earn
 0.197 0.165 0.108 0.201 0.369 
ROA 0.044 0.384 -0.036 0.031 0.071 
SIZE 6.012 2.199 4.422 5.982 7.511 
lnBM -0.712 0.847 -1.187 -0.666 -0.186 
LOSS 0.330 0.470 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PMACA 0.006 1.964 -0.049 0.000 0.043 
SalesG 0.674 15.960 -0.040 0.070 0.195 
LEV 0.216 0.356 0.017 0.180 0.330 
Export 0.010 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.013 
Altman 3.824 9.789 1.528 2.962 5.140 
CashVol 0.083 0.108 0.031 0.055 0.096 
EP 0.261 0.414 0.002 0.222 0.489 
ACH 0.233 0.211 0.000 0.250 0.250 
SEG 2.689 2.013 1.000 2.000 4.000 
|SPI| 0.031 0.122 0.000 0.003 0.019 
BigN 0.837 0.340 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CI 0.111 8.435 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FEE 13.285 1.480 12.206 13.254 14.277 
Restate  0.142 0.352 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tenure 9.575 8.371 3.000 7.000 13.000 
GCAO 0.033 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Delay  6.925 1.545 5.657 6.782 7.937 
SPEC 0.177 0.379 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AudChg 0.089 0.285 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Accuracy -0.345 0.430 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 
ICC 0.106 0.068 0.071 0.094 0.124 
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Table 3 presents the correlations among variables to enter the regression. The bottom left 
triangular matrix is the Pearson correction coefficient, and the upper right triangular matrix is 
Spearman‟s rank correlation coefficient. From the table, I observe that there are significant 
positive correlations between accounting comparability (Comp
Acct
) and earnings comparability 
(Comp
Earn
), evidenced by the coefficients 0.069 (Pearson) and 0.053 (Spearman), respectively. 
Notably, Comp
Acct
 is positively correlated with firm value (SIZE) and profitability (ROA) and 
negatively related to cash flow volatility (CashVol), special items (|SPI|), abnormal accruals 
(PMACA), audit fees (FEE), audit report lag (Delay), and financial reporting restatement 
(Restate).   
Like accounting comparability, Comp
Earn
 shows a similar pattern of correlation with the 
firm characteristics variables. It is negatively correlated with audit fees, audit delay, and 
abnormal accruals.  For simplicity, cash flow comparability (Comp
CFO
) is not tabulated for 




, it is negatively correlated with audit fees, 

















0.053 0.325 -0.027 -0.198 -0.340 0.149 0.027 0.370 -0.173 0.146 -0.017 0.094 -0.033 
Comp
Earn
 0.069  0.074 -0.014 -0.010
#
 -0.014 0.031 0.147 0.044 0.021 -0.003
#
 -0.031 0.070 -0.041 
SIZE 0.267 0.091 
 
0.770 -0.592 -0.462 -0.342 0.030 0.420 -0.084 0.289 -0.062 0.391 0.001
#
 
FEE -0.054 -0.022 0.773  -0.202 -0.421 -0.274 -0.043 0.221 0.187 0.317 -0.025 0.332 0.063 
Delay -0.207 -0.017 -0.596 -0.399 
 
0.265 -0.128 -0.061 -0.302 0.053 -0.222 0.025 -0.345 0.023 
CashVol -0.262 -0.049 -0.344 -0.358 0.225 
 





 -0.177 -0.189 0.179 0.045 
 
-0.057 0.146 0.018 -0.007
#
 -0.019 -0.501 -0.011
!
 




 -0.071 0.032 -0.057 
ROA 0.374 0.023 0.354 0.237 -0.285 -0.461 -0.017 0.083 
 
-0.273 0.128 -0.049 0.115 -0.006
#
 




 -0.461  -0.042 -0.015 -0.069 0.027 
Tenure 0.136 0.012
!
 0.305 0.336 -0.222 -0.187 -0.027 -0.006
#




 0.208 -0.032 




 -0.020 -0.056 -0.014 -0.025 
 
-0.029 0.094 





Restate -0.050 -0.078 0.002
#
 0.022 0.009 0.022 -0.006
#
 -0.013 -0.085 0.002
#





Pearson (Spearman) correlations are below (above) the diagonal. All correlations are significant at the 5% level except those with superscript „
!
‟ indicating 
5%~10% level or „
#
‟ indicating ≥ 10% level. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles each year before the correlation analysis.  Refer to the 
Appendix I for variable definitions. 
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5.    EMPIRICAL ANALYSES  
 This section presents the regression models and the results from the tests of the 
hypotheses described in Section 4. Audit fees and audit delay are more related to audit effort. I 
first present the empirical model and results on the relation between audit delay and accounting 
comparability. I then analyze the relation between audit fees and comparability. Furthermore, I 
examine the association between comparability and audit outcomes. Specifically, audit quality 
proxied by abnormal accruals is an indirect audit outcome, whereas audit opinion and auditor 
report accuracy are directly observable outcomes.      
5.1. Audit Delay Regression  
The first test of audit effort is using audit delay, the number of calendar days from fiscal 
year-end to the date of the auditor‟s report.  Understanding the determinants of audit delays may 
provide some insights into audit efficiency, and could improve our understanding of market 
reactions to earning releases (Ashton et al. 1989). Using Australian sample, an early study by 
Dyer and McHugh (1975) first reports three corporate attributes, namely the corporate size, the 
year-end closing date, and the profitability as major explanatory factors of audit delay. Later, 
Davies and Whittred (1980) find that the financial year-end has little influence on the total 
reporting lag. They also find that companies experiencing extreme changes in the (absolute) 
amount of extraordinary items take significantly longer time to release both their preliminary and 
final annual accounts. They further suggest that variables such as extraordinary items, changes in 
accounting techniques, changes in auditors, audit firm size, and audit opinion should be 
considered.  
Prior literature has revealed various client and audit firm factors that potentially influence 
audit delay. Among client-related variables, audit delay is a decreasing function of client size, of 
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client industry (whether the client is in the financial industry), and of client ownership 
concentration (e.g., Ashton et al. 1987; Newton and Ashton 1989; Bamber et al. 1993). Audit 
delay is an increasing function of client extraordinary items (Bamber et al. 1993), of client net 
losses (Ettredge et al. 2000), of client financial condition (Bamber et al. 1993), of modified 
auditor opinions on the financial statements (Bamber et al. 1993; Ettredge et al. 2000), and of the 
client‟s correction of previously reported interim earnings (Kinney and McDaniel 1993). Among 
auditor-related factors, audit delay is a decreasing function of the proportion of audit work 
accomplished at interim dates (Ashton et al. 1987; Knechel and Payne 2001),  and of the 
percentage of total audit hours related to partner and manager time (Knechel and Payne 2001). 
Audit delay is an increasing function of a structured audit approach (Cushing 1989; Newton and 
Ashton 1989; Bamber et al. 1993; Ettredge et al. 2000) and of incremental audit effort (Knechel 
and Payne 2001).  Based on these prior researches, I build the regression model as followed:  
                          
                                                
                                                                                      
                                                        
                                                                                                                        (5-1) 
  
where: 
Delay = The square root of the number of calendar days from fiscal year-end to 
the date of the auditor‟s report;  
Comp
Acct
 = Accounting comparability following De Franco et al. (2011); 
GCAO =  A dummy variable, 1 if auditor issues a going-concern audit opinion, 
and 0 otherwise; 
BigN = 1 if the client has a Big-4/5 auditor in yeart, and 0 otherwise; 
SIZE = The natural logarithm of market value of equity at fiscal yearend; 




LEV = The natural logarithm of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, 
divided by average total assets; 
lnBM = The natural logarithm of book value of equity/market value of equity at 
fiscal yearend; 
SalesG = Sales growth; 
LOSS  =  A dummy variable, 1 if net income before extraordinary items is 
negative, and 0 otherwise; 
|DA| = The absolute value of discretionary accruals scaled by lagged assets, 
calculated from the Kothari et al. (2005) performance-adjusted accruals 
model of Jones (1991);
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|SPI| = The absolute value of special items divided by total assets; 
SEG = Square root of the number of business segments; 
Export  =  The ratio of foreign sales to total sales; 
Restate = 1 if there is a subsequent financial restatement, 0 otherwise; 
ACH = Accounting choice heterogeneity; 
OWN = The client‟s concentration of ownership; 
Tenure  = The number of consecutive years that firm i has retained the auditor 
since 1974 at year t. 
 
In addition to other controls I discuss above, I control for accounting choice 
heterogeneity (ACH), a factor of comparability and consistence,  because audit task is 
presumably be related to a client‟s unique accounting inputs, but attestation should not be 
disguised by changing accounting methods.
22
  Audit literature suggests that the extent to which 
                                                          
21
 I measure performance-adjusted discretionary accruals using the modified Jones (1991) model as recommended 
by Kothari et al. (2005). The Kothari et al. model is as follows and is estimated by year and by two-digit SIC code, 
scaled by average lagged assets:  
   
     
   
 
     
   
       
     
   
    
     
          ,  where for firm i and fiscal 
year t, AC equals net income before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows from continuing operations); 
∆Sales equals change in accounts receivable from yeart −1 to yeart; PPE equals net property, plant, and equipment in 
yeart ; ROA is net income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged assets, and    equals the estimated 
discretionary accruals. I use |DA| (the absolute value of  ) to proxy for the level of abnormal accruals. 
22
 DeFond and Hung (2003) calculate the ACH index variable ranging from 0 to 1 that captures the comparability of 
a firm‟s accounting choices with its industry peers. They find that analysts tend to forecast cash flows for firms with 
more heterogeneous accounting choices relative to their industry peers.  
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the client‟s shares are widely held is one of the factors related to audit business risk (e.g., Ashton 
et al. 1987; Arens et al. 2004). Using the average number of shares per shareholder as the proxy 
for the client‟s ownership concentration, Bamber et al. (1993) empirically show that it is 
negatively related to audit delay. Ettredge et al. (2000) also find a similar result for a quarterly 
earnings release lag. I measure client‟s concentration of ownership (OWN) as the natural 
logarithm of client‟s number of common shares outstanding divided by the number of common 
shareholders (i.e. the natural logarithm of average number of shares per shareholder). I predict a 
negative relation between       
    and the audit delay (i.e., a negative β1), and the coefficient 
of ACH to be positive. 
Table 4 shows regression of audit delay on accounting comparability for the pooled 
sample, controlling the fixed year and industry effect. I implement the OLS regression based on 
equation (5-1) after removing outliers (with the absolute value of studentized residuals greater 
than 2)
23
. I find a negative coefficient (β1 = -0.039, t = -5.97) of accounting comparability 
(Comp
Acct
), statistically significantly at the 1% level. This supports the first hypothesis that 
accounting comparability is positively associated with the timeliness of audit report. In other 
words, a client firm with a higher degree of accounting comparability can help its auditor 
produce the audit report more quickly, or auditor may spend lesser effort in completion of audit 
task.  
Table 4 also shows that accounting choice heterogeneity (ACH) is positively associated 
with the delay (coefficient of 0.121, t = 2.93). Consistent with Bamber et al. (1993), financial 
leverage (LEV) is positively related to audit delay (coefficient of 0.527, t = 11.81), and firm 
value (SIZE) is negatively related to delay (coefficient of -0.428, t = -51.47).   However, I do not 
                                                          
23
 In certain cases, outliers in the dataset skew regression results. I apply an alternative way, a robust estimation 
method other than least square controlling studentized residuals. In SAS I use PROC ROBUSTREG command, S-
estimator (to minimize the variances of the estimator). The results, un-tabulated, are statistically very similar. 
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find a significant relation between financial restatement (Restate) and delay, nor do I find a 
significant relation between abnormal accruals (|DA|) and delay.  Prior research finds no 
relationship between client operational complexity and audit delay (e.g., Ashton et al. 1987; 
Bamber et al. 1993), while I find that there is a significantly positive relation between business 
segments / foreign sales and audit delay (coefficient of SEG = 0.054 t = 12.60 and coefficient of 
Export = 0.087 t = 5.36, respectively).  
I also control for auditing firm size in equation (5-1). While prior literature has not 
specifically reported the relationship between large auditing firms and audit delay. Research has 
reported the audit production by Big-N auditor, for instance, audit reports of large auditors are 
more conservative with more modifications (Francis and Krishnan 1999), and more informative 
reporting (Weber and Willenborg 2003), smaller abnormal accruals (Becker et al. 1998; Francis 
et al. 1999), and stronger earnings-return relation (Teoh and Wong 1993; Krishnan 2003).  In this 
study, I find a negative relation between Big-N auditor and audit delay (coefficient = -0.459, t = -
19.05), and auditor tenure (Tenure) is also positively related to the timeliness of audit reporting 
(coefficient = -0.019, t = -3.07).    
5.2. Audit Pricing Regression  
Following Chaney et al. (2004), I model the determination of audit fees as follows: 
 
                       
                                                
                                                                                
                                                                             
                                                                                                              (5-2) 
 
where: 





Association between Accounting Comparability and Audit Delay 
 





t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept   7.342 0.495 14.83 <.0001 
Comp
Acct
 - -0.039 0.007 -5.97 <.0001 
GCAO + 0.661 0.052 12.68 <.0001 
BigN - -0.459 0.024 -19.05 <.0001 
SIZE  - -0.428 0.005 -51.47 <.0001 
ROA - -0.350 0.052 -6.76 <.0001 
LEV + 0.527 0.045 11.81 <.0001 
lnBM ? -0.068 0.011 -6.16 <.0001 
SalesG ? 0.183 0.021 8.83 <.0001 
Loss  + 0.105 0.022 4.88 <.0001 
|DA| ? -0.022 0.015 -1.44 0.149 
|SPI| + 0.535 0.131 4.08 <.0001 
SEG + 0.054 0.004 12.60 <.0001 
Export + 0.087 0.015 5.36 <.0001 
Restate  + 0.009 0.022 0.41 0.684 
ACH + 0.121 0.041 2.93 0.003 
OWN - -0.014 0.005 -2.98 0.003 
Tenure  ? -0.019 0.006 -3.07 0.002 
Year and Industry Effect   Yes 
Adj. R
2       
(Obs.=20,750)  0.475 
 
 The regression is based on the model equation (5-1). The dependent variable is audit delay (Delay), the explanatory 
variable of interest is accounting comparability (Comp
Acct
). Estimates on year dummies and industry dummies are 








CI = Client importance, calculated as client i‟s total assets to the sum of the 
total assets of all the clients of an auditor j at the same year (Chen et al. 
2010); 
Quick  = The quick ratio, current assets less inventory scaled by current liabilities; 
CURR = The current ratio, calculated as current assets divided by current 
liabilities; 
ISSUE = A dummy variable set equal to 1 when the firm issued equity or long-
term debt during the year that is greater than 5% of its total assets; 
AudChg = 1 if there is the auditor change during the fiscal year, 0 otherwise.  
 
The other variables are previously described. I include various proxies for audit risk as 
they are known to affect both auditors‟ client acceptance decisions and audit fee pricing (e.g., 
Simunic and Stein 1996; Whisenant et al. 2003). These variables are client size to control for the 
client‟s market value (SIZE), the natural logarithm of a firm‟s end-of-year equity book-to-market 
ratio (lnBM), quick ratio (Quick), and current ratio (CURR). Client importance (CI) captures the 
economic bonding between the auditor and the client by the relative significance of a client‟s 
total fees to the fee revenue received by the auditor (Chung and Kallapur 2003; Chen et al. 
2010).  I control for changes in the firm‟s financing activities (ISSUE). I also control for 
profitability (ROA), the restatement variable (Restate), and the auditor change variable 
(AudChg), since audit fee changes could be due to performance or/and financial restatements 
or/and differences in the successor auditor‟s audit fee model, beyond the changes in the 
fundamentals of the client firm.  
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Table 5 presents the results of the OLS regression of audit fees on accounting 
comparability for the pooled sample, controlling fixed year and industry effect.
24
 As expected, 
the coefficient of Comp
Acct 
(β1 = -0.017 t = -7.62) shows that audit fees and accounting 
comparability are negatively related, supporting the hypothesis H2. The regression results are 
also consistent with the simple correlation analysis in Section 4. I interpret that a client with a 
higher degree of accounting comparability entails less audit risk and thus less audit effort in 
general it requires for auditing engagement, as a consequence, auditor would price less fees.  
Regression results show that the other factors related to audit fees are essentially 
consistent with prior researches. Client size (SIZE) is an increasing function of audit fees 
(evidenced by positive t = 83.74 and significant p-value < .0001). The significantly positive 
coefficient of BigN (0.100, t = 5.49) indicates that there is a Big-N audit fee premium. Three 
variables, special items (|SPI|), segment (SEG), and foreign sales (Export) – proxy for client 
complexity, are shown to be positively associated with audit fees. Five variables, current ratio 
(CURR), quick ratio (Quick), profitability (ROA), financial leverage (LEV), and the propensity of 
auditor‟s issuing a going-concern opinion (GCAO), control for client financial condition. The 
coefficients of ROA is negative (-0.203), while the coefficients of leverage (LEV) and the 
indicator variable of a going-concern opinion (GCAO) are positive, 0.588 and 0.209, 
respectively. The client importance metric (CI) is negatively related to audit fees (coefficient = -
0.696, t = -14.91). Auditor change generally is linked with reduced audit pricing (coefficient = -
                                                          
24
 Instead of OLS regression controlling industry and year effect, I also use standard errors clustered by firm and by 




0.356, t = -20.68).
25
 The overall model is significant and the adjusted R
2
 of 45% is in line with 
prior audit fee studies.   
TABLE 5 
Association between Accounting Comparability and Audit Fees  
 





t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept   7.824 0.055 42.25 <.0001 
Comp
Acct
 - -0.017 0.002 -7.62 <.0001 
SIZE + 0.536 0.004 83.74 <.0001 
CI - -0.696 0.048 -14.91 <.0001 
LEV + 0.588 0.038 15.37 <.0001 
Quick ? -0.005 0.002 -2.24 0.025 
CURR ? 0.013 0.004 3.60 0.001 
BigN + 0.100 0.018 5.49 <.0001 
ROA - -0.203 0.037 -5.56 <.0001 
LOSS + 0.187 0.015 12.31 <.0001 
|SPI| + 1.057 0.092 -11.44 <0.001 
Export + 4.523 0.188 24.09 <.0001 
SEG + 0.081 0.003 27.40 <.0001 
ISSUE ? -0.063 0.015 -4.24 <.0001 
lnBM ? 0.343 0.007 46.95 <.0001 
SalesG ? -0.152 0.012 -10.60 <.0001 
GCAO  + 0.209 0.037 5.67 <.0001 
Restate + 0.080 0.015 5.45 <.0001 
AudChg ? -0.356 0.017 -20.68 <.0001 
Year and Industry Effect  Yes 
Adj. R
2       
(Obs.=20,750)  0.451 
                                                          
25
 In order to control for the effect of non-voluntary auditor changes (e.g., Arthur Anderson clients, mergers and 




(Footnote of Table 5 continues): 
The regression is based on the model equation (5-2). The dependent variable is audit fees (Fee), the explanatory 
variable of interest is accounting comparability (Comp
Acct
). Estimates on year dummies and industry dummies are 
not reported for brevity. Refer to the Appendix I for all other variable definition.  
 
5.3. Audit Quality Regression 
The third test is to examine the association between audit quality and accounting 
comparability. I follow Geiger and North (2006) and Dao et al. (2012) using performance-
matched abnormal current accruals to proxy for audit quality, as the dependent variable in model 
equation (5-3). I use the following model to test H3:  
                            
                      
                        
                                                                               
                                                                                 (5-3) 
  
where: 
PMACA = Performance-matched abnormal current accruals following Francis et 
al. (2005); 
CashVol = The standard deviation of cash flows, scaled by lagged assets, over 
rolling 6 years (requiring a minimum of 4 years of data to estimate); 
TAcc = Total accruals (earnings less operating cash flows, scaled by current 
year total assets); 
AGE = The inverse value of firm age based on the CRSP return data; 
EP = Earnings persistence over rolling 16 quarters (requiring a minimum of 
8 quarters of data to estimate in the autoregressive model); 
SPEC = A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the auditor is a joint city and 
national industry specialist following Reichelt and Wang (2010), based 
on their definition 2 of industry market share (on p.656), 0 otherwise; 
LITI = An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in a 
high-litigation industry and 0 otherwise. High-litigation industries are 
industries with SIC codes 2833-2836 (Biotech), 3570-3577, 7370-7374 
(computer), 3600-3674 (electronics), 5200-5961 (retailing), following, 




All the other variables are explained previously in this section. Accounting comparability 
(      
    ) is my main variable of interest. I include other variables: firm age (AGE) because 
accruals differ with changes in firm life cycle (Anthony and Ramesh 1992). Client size (SIZE) is 
included because large firms tend to record larger, more stable accruals (Dechow and Dichev 
2002). Because prior research suggests that large audit firms tend to be more conservative and 
their conservatism tends to limit extreme accruals (e.g., Becker et al. 1998; Francis and Krishnan 
1999; Francis et al. 1999), I include auditor type (BigN) and industry specialist auditor (SPEC), 
following Reichelt and Wang (2010).   
In model equation (5-3), accounting comparability (Comp
Acct
) and Big-N auditor (BigN) 
are interacted, I examine whether large auditors have an effect on accounting comparability that 
is incremental to their impact on earnings quality. In case of this, I predict a negative β1 which 
would suggest that the stand-alone accounting comparability has a significant relationship with 
abnormal accruals. Lastly, I include industry and time effects because the types of accruals vary 
by industry (Barth et al. 2001), and the magnitude and type could vary by year.
26
  
 Table 6 presents the results from the regression model equation (5-3). The model is 
significant with adjusted R
2
 of 0.232, and the coefficients of the control variables generally have 
the signs expected based on prior research. The coefficient of Comp
Acct
 is negative and 
significant (β1 = -0.031 t = -3.50 p-value < 0.01), indicating that performance-matched abnormal 
current accruals are lower in a client firm with a higher degree of accounting comparability. A 
significantly negative coefficient of Comp
Acct
× BigN  (β3 = -0.042 t = -7.98 p-value < 0.01) 
indicates that the joint impact of large auditor and accounting comparability is negatively related 
to a lower level of abnormal accruals an auditee incurs.  
                                                          
26
 Lang et al. (2010) point out there is no theoretical or empirical guidance concerning appropriate control variables 
to include in a regression that explains comparability. I include industry fixed effects at the 2-digit SIC industry 
classification as a further control for innate firm characteristics and potential omitted variables. 
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Other control variables are also strongly related to a client firm‟s performance-matched 
abnormal current accruals. Firm profitability (ROA), firm valuation (SIZE), and earnings 
persistence (EP) are negatively related to PMACA. It shows that industry specialist auditor 
(SPEC) also contain firm‟s accrual management (β14 = -0.008 t = -2.11). PMACA is positively 
associated with total operating accruals (TAcc), firm loss (LOSS), cash flow volatility (CashVol), 
sales growth (SalesG), and high-litigation industry (LITI). 
TABLE 6 
Association between Accounting Comparability and Audit Quality (PMACA)  
 






t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept   0.172 0.033 5.24 <.0001 
Comp
Acct
 - -0.031 0.010 -3.50 <.001 
BigN - -0.023 0.010 -2.36 0.018 
Comp
Acct
× BigN - -0.042 0.004 -7.98 <.0001 
CashVol + 0.044 0.026 1.71 0.087 
SIZE - -0.027 0.012 -2.26 0.008 
TAcc + 0.320 0.017 18.82 <.0001 
LEV ? -0.027 0.010 -2.75 0.006 
lnBM ? -0.025 0.010 -2.41 0.016 
SalesG ? 0.051 0.005 11.22 <.0001 
ROA - -0.034 0.015 -2.31 0.021 
LOSS + 0.026 0.005 5.68 0.004 
AGE ? 0.156 0.053 2.93 0.003 
EP - -0.011 0.005 -2.52 0.011 
SPEC - -0.008 0.004 -2.11 0.035 
LITI + 0.010 0.005 2.20 0.027 
Year and Industry Effect Yes 
Adj. R




(Footnote of Table 6 continues): 
The regression is based on the model equation (5-3). The dependent variable is performance-matched abnormal 
current accruals (PMACA) following the approach used by Francis et al. (2005). The explanatory variable of interest 
is accounting comparability (Comp
Acct
). Estimates on year dummies and industry dummies are not reported for 
brevity. Refer to the Appendix I for all other variable definition.  
 
 
5.4. Audit Opinion Regression  
The variable for going-concern opinion (GCAO) is directly taken from Audit Analytics 
and is coded as “1” if the auditors gave a going-concern opinion to a client in the fiscal year, and 
“0” otherwise. I hypothesize that, other things being equal, an auditee is less likely to receive a 
going-concern opinion from its auditor if the client‟s accounting comparability is high, that is to 
say, the client firm experiences low operational riskiness from a viewpoint of industry-setting 
information perspective.   
To test hypothesis H4a, I estimate the following logistic model in equation (5-4):  
                      
                                                 
                                                                                   
                                                                                          (5-4) 
 
where: 
GCAO = A dummy variable, 1 if auditor issues a going-concern audit opinion, and 0 
otherwise; 
L1ROA = Prior year return on assets;
27
 
Altman = Z-score by Altman (1983). It is a measure of the probability of bankruptcy, 
with a lower value indicating greater financial distress; 
CFO = Annual cash flows from operations less cash flows from extraordinary 
items, (OANCF–XIDOC), following the approach used by Hribar and 
Collins (2002), scaled by prior-year total assets; 
DCF = A dummy variable of CFO, if positive it is coded as 1, 0 otherwise. 
 
                                                          
27
 Instead of including both the ROA and L1ROA variables, I use the summed prior three-year earnings. The 
statistical pattern of model equation (5-4) is qualitatively same. 
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All other variables are as previously defined. I expect that auditors are more likely to 
issue a going-concern opinion to clients who have volatile earnings (EP), are financially 
distressed (Altman), incur a loss (LOSS), are more leveraged (LEV), and have higher litigation 
risk (LITI). I expect that auditor is less likely to issue a going-concern opinion if the client is 
large in size (SIZE), is more profitable at current year and prior year, has higher growth 
opportunities (lnBM), and is Big-N audited (BigN). I include auditor differentiation type (SPEC) 
as a factor of audit opinion metric. Reichelt and Wang (2010) find that when the auditor is both a 
national and a city-specific industry specialist, its clients are more likely to be issued a going-
concern audit opinion.  
The results of estimating equation (5-4) are reported in Table 7. The model is 
significantly at p-value < 0.01, with pseudo R
2
 around 27% and Max-Rescaled R
2
 around 49%. 
All control variables are significant at p < 0.05 except lnBM, LITI, and ISSUE. The control 




Table 7 results report that a client firm with a higher degree of accounting comparability 
is less likely to receive a going-concern opinion, evidenced by a significantly negative parameter 
estimate (β1 = -0.070, λ
2
 = 20.80, p-value < 0.01).  Lennox (1999) shows that cash flows (CFO) 
and leverage (LEV) have non-linear effects on financial viability. Failure to take account of these 









). The results, untabulated for simplicity, 
show qualitatively similar for control variables, whilst the estimate of Comp
Acct
 becomes more 
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 The sign of the LOSS coefficient is negative due to correlation with the ROA variable, which if excluded results in 




significant. Overall, the results support the hypothesis H4a; auditor is less likely to issue a going-
concern report when the client‟s accounting comparability is higher, ceteris paribus.   
TABLE 7 







Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept  0.368 0.037 47.79 <.0001 
Comp
Acct
 - -0.070 0.015 20.80 <.0001 
SIZE - -0.519 0.049 108.06 <.0001 
BigN - -0.424 0.134 9.87 0.002 
LEV + 2.629 0.346 57.76 <.0001 
LOSS + -0.860 0.239 21.74 <.0001 
ROA - -0.894 0.261 11.68 0.001 
L1ROA - -0.491 0.229 4.58 0.032 
LITI + 0.136 0.328 1.12 0.288 
Altman  + 0.055 0.011 9.20 <.0001 
SPEC + 0.227 0.105 5.21 <0.001 
lnBM ? -0.097 0.068 2.02 0.123 
CFO - -2.301 0.396 33.61 <.0001 
DCF - -0.511 0.178 8.22 0.004 
EP - -0.292 0.161 6.41 0.009 
ISSUE ? -0.134 0.147 0.83 0.361 
Year and Industry Effects Yes  
    
(Obs. = 20,750)  Pseudo R
2
 = 0.268     Max-Rescaled R
2
 = 0.493 
 
The logit regression is based on model equation (5-4). Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tailed and based on Wald 
Chi-squares robust to heteroscedasticity and time-series correlation following the methodology in Rogers (1993).  




Hopwood et al. (1994) emphasize the importance of client financial distress for the 
auditor‟s going-concern decision because auditors issue going-concern disclosures only to clients 
experiencing difficulties, and an apparent lack of financial stress may be due to management‟s 
manipulations. Prior literature (e.g., Lim and Tan 2008; Reichelt and Wang 2010) restrict their 
going-concern opinion analysis to financially distressed firms. Also, Lennox and Pittman (2010) 
indicate negative book equity as companies suffer financial distress. I define that auditor‟s 
opinion is accurate (Accuracy =1) if a going-concern opinion is issued and the client 
subsequently occurs negative operating cash flow or book value, and not accurate (Accuracy = ‒
1) if a going-concern opinion is not issued before the client subsequently occurs negative 
operating cash flows or is issued to subsequently viable clients, Accuracy is 0 otherwise.
29
 The 















1 if GCAO is issued for financially distressed clients. A firm is defined as a 
financial distressed firm if it reports negative operating cash flow or negative 
book value in the following year; 
-1 if GCAO is not issued for financial distressed clients or issued to 
subsequently viable clients (viability means, in the following year, 2 out 4 
quarterly ROAs are positive, or annual ROA is nonnegative); 
0, otherwise.  
 
The average value of Accuracy is -0.345, which echoes the finding by Geiger and 
Raghunandan (2001): the proportion of bankruptcy companies that receive a going-concern audit 
                                                          
29
 The main difficulty in measuring the accuracy of audit reports is that one does not directly observe whether 
companies deserve clean or qualified audit opinion (Lennox 1999). Using bankruptcy outcome as an ex post 
measure of whether a company should been given a qualified report is not a prefect measure of accuracy. 
Meanwhile, “premier” bankruptcy prediction models as a benchmark of evaluating the accuracy of audit report do 
not appear to be accurate (Louwers 1998). Refer to Hopwood et al. (1994) for their categorization of financial stress.   
30
 Prior studies examine both types of going-concern reporting errors (i.e., type I errors - modified opinions rendered 
to subsequently viable clients; and type II errors - unmodified opinions rendered to subsequently bankrupt clients). 
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opinion in the year immediately preceding bankruptcy is less than 50%.
31
 To test hypothesis 
H4b, I estimate the following logistic model in equation (5-5): 
                               
                                           
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                                       (5-5) 
 
where: 
lnSales = The natural log of sales revenue (in thousands of dollars); 
EXCH = 1 if listed on the New York or American Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise. 
 
All the other variables are defined as earlier. Following Geiger and Raghunandan (2006), 
I add client size (lnSales), audit delay (Delay), and stock exchange (EXCH) as additional 
controls. Following Geiger and Raghunandan (2002), I also control for audit tenure (Tenure). I 
use ordered Probit model to perform censored regression analysis.
32
 The results of estimating 
equation (5-5) are reported in Table 8.   
All control variables are significant at p < 0.05 except BigN. As more than 80% of sample 
client firms are audited by Big-N firms, the results shows that big audit firms are ineffective in 
their professional judgment regarding rendering a clean or a going-concern opinion,
33
 consistent 
with Geiger and Rama (2003) who study audit reporting decisions on financially stressed 
                                                          
31
 Palmrose (1987) and St. Pierre and Anderson (1984) find that half of all litigation against auditors is associated 
with client bankruptcy and/or severe financial stress. Carcello and Palmrose (1994) report that auditors are named as 
defendants 74% of the time when litigation followed client bankruptcy. The importance of litigation on auditor 
reporting behavior is also shown by Geiger and Raghunandan (2001) reporting a lower frequency of going concern 
opinions after passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, a law that generally lowers auditor 
litigation risk. 
32
 To test the audit opinion accuracy, the qualitative and limited dependent variable, I use PROC QLIM command in 
SAS to estimate ordered Probit model. I use various sensitivity tests (e.g., specifying a logistic distribution and/or 
assuming a heteroscedastic logit model).  
33
 In the case of a type I error, clients do not welcome the receipt of audit reports modified for going concern, 
particularly if the report is viewed as unwarranted based on their continued viability. Clients may express this 
displeasure by switching to a different auditor (Geiger et al. 1998; Carcello and Neal 2003). I delete client firms who 
change auditor because clients may express displeasure by switching to a different auditor (Geiger et al. 1998; 
Carcello and Neal 2003).  I also delete the client firms audited by Arthur Anderson during 2000 to 2003. The 
coefficient estimate of β3 still remain insignificant.   
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companies and conclude there is no Big-4 reporting effect.
34
 Whilst industry specialist auditor 
(of joint national level and city level) are more capable of expressing an accurate opinion 
(evidenced by a positive β10 on SPEC = 0.062, p-value = 0.032). More importantly, the 
coefficient on accounting comparability (Comp
Acct
) is significantly positive (β1 = 0.017 t = 3.17 
p-value = 0.001). It supports that a client characteristics of high accounting comparability is 
helpful for auditor‟s professional judgment in a going-concern assessment. Hence, the results 
confirm the hypothesis H4b that accounting comparability is positively related to auditor‟s 
reporting accuracy, if client failure is preceded by a going-concern audit opinion. 
The control variables, lnSales, ROA, L1ROA, and CFO have predicted coefficient signs. 
The client size (lnSales) has a positive effect on opinion accuracy (β2 = 0.134, p-value < 0.01). 
Nogler (1995) finds that smaller companies are more likely to resolve their going-concern 
uncertainties and subsequently receive an unmodified opinion from their auditors; and that larger 
companies receiving going-concern modifications are more likely to subsequently file for 
bankruptcy. Like client firm size, profitability (ROA) and earnings persistence (EP) also has a 
significant positive effect on audit reporting accuracy. The coefficient of EXCH is positive and 
significant (β17 = 0.054 t = 5.21). Like firm size, listing on large exchanges is positively 
associated subsequently bankruptcy (Geiger and Raghunandan 2006), and is easier for auditor to 
judge the client‟s going-concern-related decision.  For the controls of audit tenure and reporting 
lag (the number of delay days from fiscal year-end to audit report date), results show that audit 
tenure (Tenure) is positively associated with audit opinion report accuracy while audit reporting 
lag (Delay) is negatively associated with audit opinion accuracy.  
 
                                                          
34
 My testing results are also consistent with other researcher‟s findings, e.g., both Mutchler et al. (1997) and Geiger 
et al. (2005) examine prior audit reports issued to bankrupt companies and conclude there is no significant Big-4 




Ordered Probit Model of Audit Opinion Accuracy and Accounting Comparability  
 
      Prediction  Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept  -0.259 0.060 -6.30 <.0001 
Comp
Acct
 + 0.017 0.005 3.17 0.001 
lnSales + 0.134 0.008 16.01 <.0001 
BigN + 0.030 0.027 1.18 0.238 
LEV ? 0.384 0.097 3.95 <.0001 
LOSS ? -0.374 0.034 -10.78 <.0001 
ROA + 0.405 0.107 3.76 <.001 
L1ROA + 0.595 0.085 6.99 <.0001 
LITI ? -0.129 0.028 -4.56 <.0001 
Altman  ? -0.006 0.002 -2.11 0.035 
SPEC + 0.062 0.030 2.07 0.032 
lnBM ? 0.138 0.018 7.58 <.0001 
CFO + 2.028 0.163 12.38 <.0001 
DCF - -0.485 0.044 -10.90 <.0001 
EP + 0.072 0.035 2.02 0.043 
ISSUE + 0.068 0.025 2.72 0.001 
Delay  - -0.012 0.005 -2.34 0.003 
EXCH + 0.054 0.009 5.21 <.0001 
Tenure + 0.009 0.002 3.87 <.001 
Year and Industry Effects                                          Yes    
 
 
The order Probit model regression is based on equation (5-5), the dependent variable is audit opinion accuracy 
(Accuracy). The sample observation is 20,750 during the period from 2000 to 2009. Estimates on year dummies and 








(Table 8 continues): 
 
Goodness-of-Fit Measures 
Measure Value Formula 
Aldrich-Nelson 0.277  
 
   
 




Adjusted Estrella 0.374    
        
       
  








Veall-Zimmermann 0.529   
       
       
 
McKelvey-Zavoina 0.500   
 
Goodness-of-fit measures are also displayed. All measures except McKelvey-Zavoina are based on the log-
likelihood function value. The likelihood ratio test statistic has chi-square distribution conditional on the null 































6.  SENSITIVITY AND ADDITIONAL TESTS 
 6.1.  Other Comparability Proxies  
 In section 4, I describe three alternative measures of accounting comparability, namely 
earnings comparability, cash flow comparability, and stock return comparability (or economic 
relatedness among firm peers). I then use earnings comparability (Comp
Earn
), cash flow 
comparability (Comp
CFO
) and economic relatedness (Comp
RET







 and audit delay based on model equation (5-











These independent variables are the standardized rank (i.e. the rank within the industry-year 
group divided by the number of observations in the group). I use the regression approach of 
standard errors cluster by firm and by year to allow for cross-section and time-series dependence 
(Gow et al. 2010). Unlike the original model equation (5-1), there is no control for fixed year and 
industry effect in new regression.  
The results are shown in Table 9. The first column I use earnings comparability to 
explain the audit delay. The coefficient of Comp
Earn
 (β2 = -0.258 t-value = -2.24) supports the 
argument that a higher degree of earnings comparability is negatively (positively) associated 
with audit delay (timeliness of audit report). The same conclusion can be drawn from cash flow 
comparability and economic relatedness as explanatory variables in other two columns 
explaining audit delay, evidenced by significantly negative coefficients (β2 = -0.365 t-value = -
4.47 and β2 = -0.297 t-value = -4.56, respectively, at the 1% level). The controls variables are 
same as in Table 4, and their coefficients are qualitatively similar. The results from Table 9 are 
consistent with the first hypothesis. I find that accounting comparability (or alternative 
comparability metrics) is negatively (positively) related to audit reporting lag (audit reporting 
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timeliness). Table 9 also shows that earnings comparability (Comp
Earn
) is more modest in 
explaining the audit delay, relative to cash flow comparability (Comp
CFO
) or stock return 
comparability (Comp
RET
), evidenced by a comparison of R
2
 in these three model regression tests. 
TABLE 9 
Association between Other Comparability Metrics and Audit Delay 
 
 
Explanatory Variable = 
Earnings Comparability Cash Flow Comparability Economic Relatedness 
 Para. Estimate t Value Para. Estimate t Value Para. Estimate t Value 

















































 0.078 1.40 -0.160 -2.03
**
 


















































OWN -0.014 -1.47 0.009 1.02 -0.098 -2.59
***
 
Tenure  0.003 1.50 0.004 2.00
**
 0.003 1.74 
Adj. R
2      




(Footnote of Table 9 continues): 
The sample observation is 20,750 during the period from 2000 to 2009. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two tailed hypotheses. Significance based on 2-way cluster standard 
errors to account for time-series (firm) and cross-sectional (year) dependence. The regression is based on modified 
model equation (5-1). The dependent variable is audit delay (Delay), the explanatory variable of interest (Comp) is 
earnings comparability (Comp
Earn
) or cash flow comparability (Comp
CFO
) or stock return comparability (Comp
RET
). 
Refer to the Appendix I for all other variable description.  
 
Next I use these three alternative comparability metrics to test the relation between audit 
fees and comparability. The model is based on equation (5-2). I apply the technique of two-
dimension clustered by firm and by year, with no inclusion of year and industry dummies. I 
predict a negative relationship between a client‟s financial statement comparability and audit fees 
paid by the client.    
The results are presented in Table 10. In the first column I use earnings comparability to 
explain audit fees. The coefficient of Comp
Earn
 (β2 = -0.047 t-value = -5.27) supports the 
argument that a higher degree of earnings comparability is negatively associated with audit fees. 
As the arguments for the hypothesis H2 assert; a client firm with a higher degree of information 
comparability is associated with lower level of business risk, and at the same time, information 
comparability contributes to externality gains that result in audit efficiency. The dual effects of 
comparability consequently lead to less audit pricing.  
The same conclusion can be drawn from cash flow comparability and economic 
relatedness as explanatory variables in determination of audit fees, evidenced by significantly 
negative coefficients (β2 = -0.060 t-value = -6.38 and β2 = -0.039 t-value = -4.78, respectively, at 
the 1% level). The controls variables in Table 10 reproduce those in Table 5 and their 
coefficients are qualitatively similar. Overall, the results from Table 10 are consistent with the 
hypothesis H2. I find that accounting comparability (or alternative comparability metrics) is 





Association between Audit Fees and Other Comparability Metrics   
 
 
Explanatory Variable = 
Earnings Comparability Cash Flow Comparability Economic Relatedness 
 Para. Estimate t Value Para. Estimate t Value Para. Estimate t Value 






































































































































2      
 0.421 0.474 0.460 
 
The sample size is 20,750 during the period from 2000 to 2009. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively, based on two tailed hypotheses. Significance based on 2-way cluster standard errors to 
account for time-series (firm) and cross-sectional (year) dependence. The regression is based on modified model 
equation (5-2). The dependent variable is audit fees (FEE), the explanatory variable of interest (Comp) is earnings 
comparability (Comp
Earn
) or cash flow comparability (Comp
CFO
) or stock return comparability (Comp
RET
). Refer to 
the Appendix I for all other variable description.  
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In model (5-2), the dependent variable I use is the natural logarithm format of total audit 
fees. As an additional test, I use total fees (i.e., audit fees plus non-audit fees including tax 
service fees and other consulting fees, combined paid to the auditor) as the new dependent 
variable. The regression tests (un-tabulated for brevity) reveal that a client firm‟s accounting 
comparability is negatively associated with total service fees paid to its auditor.     
6.2. Alternative Proxies for Audit Quality  
Following Khurana and Raman (2004) and Lawrence et al. (2011) who use implied cost-
of-equity capital as an additional audit quality proxy, I examine the relation between accounting 
comparability and the ex ante cost of capital, as follows: 
                        
                                         
                                                                             
                                                                                 
                                                                                                                            (6-1) 
 
where: 
ICC = The ex ante cost-of-equity capital estimated using Hou et al. (2012) 
approach; 
TECH = An indicator variable equal to 1 when firm is in high technology industries 
(SIC code the 2830s, 3570s, 7370s, 8730s, and between 3825 and 3829), 
and 0 otherwise; 
Beta = Stock beta (systematic risk) calculated over the 36 months ending in the 
month of the fiscal year-end, following, e.g., Khurana and Raman (2004).  
 
The sample is from U.S. public firms with share code 10 and 11. The ex ante cost-of-
equity sample reflects the intersection of Compustat and CRSP data. After imposing the 
necessary requirements to calculate the ex ante cost-of-capital regression variables and all the 
controls, I obtain a sample of 18,256 during fiscal years 2000-2009. In addition, I control the 
industry type of high-technology industries relative to firms in low-technology industries. It may 
take considerable time and effort for an auditor to acquire a thorough knowledge of the business 
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entity and to become acquainted with a company‟s internal controls, information systems, 
recordkeeping, and audit needs. In fact, accounting comparability is generally lower for firms in 
high-technology industries relative to firms in low-technology industries. Since the cost-of-
equity capital (ICC) can vary over time, I control for the year of the observation (YearFE). Also, 
because some industries are perceived to be more risky than others, I control for industry specific 
risk using industry dummies (IndustryFE). I include the stock beta (Beta) as an explanatory 
variable, because the capital assets pricing model (CAPM) suggests that systematic risk (Beta) is 
positively correlated with the cost-of-equity capital. Hence, Beta is expected to have a positive 
sign. More importantly, I expect the primary measure of comparability, Comp
Acct
, is negatively 
related to ICC.  
Table 11 shows that the coefficient of Comp
Acct
 (β1) is -0.011 and is significantly related 
to implied cost of capital at the 1% level. That is to say, a client with the characteristics of higher 
accounting comparability is of financial reporting credibility, proxy by a lower level of implied 
cost of capital. Audits by the Big-N auditor and/or an industry specialist auditor show higher 
audit quality (evidenced by negative signs of BigN and SPEC). Collectively, the coefficients of 
control variables, SIZE through EXCH, controlling equity risk, essentially show a qualitatively 
similar pattern with those in Table 6. Specifically, Beta is positively related to the ex ante cost of 
capital (β16 = 0.025 t = 3.22 p-value = 0.002). Furthermore, if perceived audit quality is driven by 
litigation risk, high-technology industries, and listing exchange, then the predicted signs for LITI, 
TECH and EXCH in implied cost of capital model are positive. The results of these coefficients 






Regressions of Implied Cost of Capital on Accounting Comparability  
 





t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept   0.127 0.013 9.77 <.0001 
Comp
Acct
 - -0.011 0.001 -10.62 <.0001 
BigN - -0.013 0.002 -7.36 <.0001 
SPEC - -0.007 0.003 -2.58 0.010 
SIZE - -0.008 0.001 -9.25 <.0001 
|DA| + 0.003 0.002 0.89 0.399 
LEV ? 0.007 0.003 -2.88 0.004 
lnBM ? 0.009 0.001 -11.41 <.0001 
SalesG ? -0.003 0.001 -2.47 0.013 
ROA + 0.084 0.003 22.31 <.0001 
LOSS + 0.043 0.001 35.08 <.0001 
AGE ? 0.156 0.095 1.63 0.123 
EP - -0.024 0.009 -2.51 0.009 
CashVol - -0.049 0.007 -7.06 <.0001 
LITI ? 0.010 0.003 3.98 <.001 
TECH ? 0.025 0.008 3.60 <.001 
Beta  + 0.025 0.008 3.22 0.002 
EXCH ? -0.087 0.021 4.18 <.0001 
Year and Industry Effects   Yes  
Adj. R
2       
(Obs.=19,856)  0.274 
 
The dependent variable is implied cost of capital (ICC) following Hou et al. (2012); Appendix II details the 
measurement of ICC. The regression is based on model equation (6-1). Once again, in Table 11 the year-specific and 





Comparability of financial information enriches an individual firm‟s information 
environment. Financial statement comparability is beneficial for audit planning and risk 
assessment of client business. It would also help financial analysts following clients of high 
comparability be able to make more accurate forecasts of future earnings than those analysts 
following clients of low comparability. More recently, Behn et al. (2008) and Lawrence et al. 
(2011) include financial analyst forecast accuracy as an audit-quality proxy. I use analyst 
forecast accuracy as alternative audit-quality measure to proxy for an enhanced level of decision 
making by sophisticated financial statement users.
35
 I use the following model employed by 
Behn et al. (2008): 
                        
                                         
                                                                            
                                                                                    
                                                                                                                         (6-2) 
 
where: 
AFA = Analyst forecast accuracy, as per Lang and Lundholm (1996); 
UE = Unexpected earnings, measured as (net income at year t+1 – net income at 
year t)/market value of equity at the end of year t; 
Horizon  = The natural logarithm of the average number of calendar days between 
forecast announcement date and subsequent earnings announcement date; 
FOL = The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following the 
client. 
 
All the other variables are described previously. The dependent variable is analysts 
forecast accuracy (AFA), the absolute value of the forecast error multiplied by -100, scaled by 
the stock price at the end of the prior fiscal year, where the forecast error is the I/B/E/S analysts‟ 
mean annual earnings forecast less the actual earnings as reported by I/B/E/S. Observations 
                                                          
35
 The forecast accuracy metric is regarded as a company‟s accounting information quality, e.g., Callen et al. (2012).   
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having AFA variable smaller than -1.5 (less than 1% of the distribution) are removed as 
outliers.
36
 The full sample has a total of 18,502 firm-year observations during the period from 
2000 to 2009.  
The results, presented in Table 12, displays coefficients and p-value of fixed effect panel 
data regression with year dummies and industry dummies. The coefficient of Comp
Acct
 (β1) is 
0.005 and is significantly related to analysts forecast accuracy at the 1% level. That is to say, a 
client with the characteristics of higher accounting comparability is of financial statement 
quality, proxy by more accurate forecasts by financial analysts. The results are consistent with 
De Franco et al. (2011) who find that comparability is beneficial for financial analysts in their 
forecast activities.  
Table 12 also shows that audits by the Big-N auditor and/or an industry specialist auditor 
indicate higher audit quality, evidenced by significantly positive signs of BigN and SPEC with 
coefficients 0.006 and 0.008, respectively. Collectively, the coefficients of control variables, 
SIZE through Beta, controlling client-related characteristics, essentially show a qualitatively 
similar pattern with prior studies (e.g., Lawrence et al. 2011). Specifically, unexpected earnings 
(UE), Beta and forecast horizon (Horizon) are negatively associated with forecast accuracy. 
More financial analysts following the client firm (FOL) and listing on NYSE or Amex Exchange 
(EXCH) improve forecast accuracy. Moreover, relevant to this analysis, I find that Big 4 audit 
clients have a larger analyst following while the joint national and city specialist auditor has no 
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Regressions of Forecast Accuracy on Accounting Comparability  
 





t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept   -0.052 0.005 -9.77 <.0001 
Comp
Acct
 + 0.005 0.002 3.79 0.001 
BigN + 0.006 0.002 3.51 0.002 
SPEC + 0.008 0.002 4.10 <.0001 
SIZE + 0.003 0.001 3.01 0.003 
TAcc + 0.003 0.002 1.02 0.309 
LEV - -0.008 0.004 -2.52 0.010 
lnBM ? -0.004 0.002 -3.44 <.0001 
SalesG ? -0.004 0.001 -2.87 0.002 
ROA + 0.002 0.001 2.31 0.020 
LOSS - 0.018 0.002 9.08 <.0001 
UE - -0.052 0.015 -3.63 0.001 
EP + 0.018 0.009 2.05 0.041 
CashVol - -0.024 0.008 -3.54 0.002 
Beta  - -0.018 0.005 -3.46 0.002 
EXCH ? 0.012 0.002 6.07 <.0001 
Horizon  - -0.007 0.001 -5.80 <.0001 
FOL + 0.016 0.005 4.01 <.0001 
Year and Industry Effects   Yes  
Adj. R
2       
(Obs. =18,502) 0.304 
 
The dependent variable is analysts forecast accuracy (AFA). Appendix III details the measure of AFA. The 
regression is based on model equation (6-2). Once again, in Table 12 the year-specific and industry-specific 







6.3.  Changes Model Analysis 
Audit effort varies with changes in inherent risk of a client firm. O‟Keefe et al. (1994) 
use data from one audit firm and document that both audit hours and the mix of labor are 
sensitive to client size, complexity, leverage, and inherent risk. I implement change analysis, 
using change in accounting comparability as the inherent risk factor, for a possible root cause 
analysis of audit effort. In the meantime, information spillover due to accounting comparability 
brings about a positive gain in terms of audit effectiveness.  
6.3.1. Does the Increase in Comparability Reduce Audit Delay?  
I reformulate the first hypothesis on the basis that if timelier audit reporting documented 
in the primary analysis (in model equation 5-1) is accompanied by an increasing degree of 
client‟s accounting comparability, the increase in comparability should subsequently reduce the 
audit reporting lag. The dependent variable in the tests is the change of audit delay. The variable 
ΔDelay is measured as the current period audit delay less the value for audit delay in the prior 
year. Similarly, I estimate two OLS regressions as specified by the following equation (6-3), 
using either the change in accounting comparability or the change in earnings comparability, 
along with control variables known to influence audit report delay. 
                      {       
              
    }                      
                                                                                  
                                                                                      
                                                                          +              
                                                                                                                               (6-3) 
 
The control variables lnBM, LEV, SIZE, ROA and etc. are computed similarly as in 
equation (5-1), and all change variables are calculated relative to prior year. The sample entering 
regression has 17,883 observations. I explicitly control for client firm characteristics so that the 
year- and industry-dummies in the regressions capture the direct effects of comparability on 
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audit report delay incremental to the indirect effects caused by changes in these firm 
characteristics. This multivariate regression approach thus mitigates the possibility that observed 
audit delay changes are due solely to other corporate changes. I also control for prior period audit 
delay (Delayit-1). 
Table 13 presents the results of estimating the change model equation (6-3) using OLS 
regression. The coefficients on two comparability measures are significant and signed consistent 
with the first hypothesis that increases in financial statement comparability are positively 










 have significantly negative coefficients (untabulated for simplicity). 
Taken together, I conclude that increases in financial statement comparability, associated with a 
reduction of business inherent risk, seem to be helpful for audit effectiveness, in terms of 
production of timely audit report.  
Other change variables controlling the change of timeliness of audit report are generally 
significant, expect the change of financial leverage (ΔLEV), change of book to market (ΔlnBM), 
change of discretionary accruals (Δ|DA|) and change of auditor tenure with the client ( Tenure).  
Audit delay of prior year (Delayit-1) is significantly related to current year change in audit delay. 
Overall, the change model is significant, and the adjusted R
2
 equals 29.4% for the change model 
with ΔComp
Acct
 as the explanatory variable, and the adjusted R
2
 equals 30.5% for the change 
model with ΔComp
Earn
 as the explanatory variable, compared with the adjusted R
2
 of 47.5% in 
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ΔLEV 0.013 0.109 0.016
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 0.094 














































Year and Industry Effect   Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2       
(Obs.=17,883) 0.294 0.305 
 
The regression is based on the model equation (6-3). The dependent variable is change in audit delay (ΔDelay), the 
explanatory variable of interest is change in accounting comparability (ΔComp
Acct
) or change in earnings 
comparability (ΔComp
Earn
). ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on 
two tailed hypotheses. Estimates on year dummies and industry dummies are not reported for brevity. Refer to the 
Appendix I for all other variable definition.  
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6.3.2. Does the Increase in Accounting Comparability Reduce Audit Pricing?  
I further analyze whether less audit fees paid are related to increased financial statement 
comparability as the client potentially entails less inherent business riskiness. Following Dao et 
al. (2012), I perform the audit fee regression in the “changes” form as follows: 
 
                  {       
              
    }                             
                                                                           
                                                                                   
                                                                                       
                                                                                                                              (6-4) 
 
For the changes model, I use the same equation (5-2) discussed in the previous section, 
except that the dependent and independent variables are all measured in changes form (i.e., value 
for year t minus the value of the same variable for year t-1). The results from the above 
multivariate regression for the change analysis are presented in Table 14. The overall model is 
statistically significant, with an adjusted R
2
 of 21.0% (model F-value = 6.75) for the change 
model with ΔComp
Acct
 as the explanatory variable and the adjusted R
2
 of 22.6% (model F-value = 
6.79) for the model with ΔComp
Earn
 as the explanatory variable. 
In Table 14 the first column using ΔComp
Acct 
to explain the change of audit fees, the 
coefficient of ΔComp
Acct
 is -0.021 (p-value = 0.070), indicating that a client firm that has an 
increase in accounting comparability leads to a reduction of audit fees paid to its external auditor.  
Similarly, an increase in earnings comparability with its coefficient of ΔComp
Earn
 (β1 = -0.039, p-
value = 0.062) is associated with lesser audit fees paid. The results suggest that an increase in 
financial statement comparability is associated with less effort for auditor, and therefore the 
auditor prices less service fees.  
A changes regression is particularly appropriate for audit fees because, in general, last 
years‟ audit fees predict well this year‟s audit fees (Dao et al. 2012). I also control prior year 
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audit fees (FEEit-1), the coefficient of β19 is 0.089 with p-value < 0.001. Other change variables 
controlling the change of audit pricing are generally significant at 10% level, expect the change 
of financing activities (ΔISSUE) and no change of auditor during a year (ΔAudChg).  In sum, the 
results of Table 14 support the hypothesis that audit fees are decreasing in comparability. These 
results support the idea that both the client firm and its auditor benefit from the higher quality 
information sets associated with firms that have higher comparability.  
In the model equation (6-4), the dependent variable I use is changes in the natural 
logarithm value of current year‟s total audit fees relative to the logarithm value of prior year‟s 
total audit fees. As an additional test, I use the change value of the log format of total fees (i.e., 
audit fees plus non-audit fee combined paid to the same auditor) as the new dependent variable. 
The changes regression results (un-tabulated for brevity) reveal that increase in a client firm‟s 
information comparability is negatively associated with the change of total service fees paid to 
its auditor.   
These changes in audit fees can be caused by direct or indirect impacts of accounting 
comparability, due to its inherent business riskiness or the knowledge spillover effect. I do not 
separate these two effects here for several reasons: (1) audit firms base their fees on the 
perceived risk of audit failure, so they are likely able to assess the overall changes in business 
operation and reporting with an aid of comparative information; (2) the audited companies with 
high accounting comparability deem their businesses less risky and less complex, and thus 
negotiation of audit fees is potentially beneficial for these client firms; and (3) the control 
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Year and Industry Effect  Yes Yes 
Model F  
6.75  
(p-value < 0.01) 
6.79  
(p-value < 0.01) 
Adj. R
2      
(Obs.=16,883)  0.210 0.226 
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(Footnote of Table 14 continues): 
The regression is based on the model equation (6-4). The dependent variable is change in audit fees (ΔFEE), the 
explanatory variable of interest is change in accounting comparability (ΔComp
Acct
) or change in earnings 
comparability (ΔComp
Earn
).  ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on 
two tailed hypotheses. Estimates on year dummies and industry dummies are not reported for brevity. Refer to the 
Appendix I for all other variable definition.  
 
6.4. Endogeneity between Audit Effort and Outcomes 
There is a two-way relationship between audit effort and audit outcomes and a potential 
effect of comparability on the auditor-client relationship.
37
 I examine the possibility that the 
estimates are biased because of the endogeneity of accounting comparability, audit effort and 
audit outcomes. In the main analysis, I take both accounting comparability and audit quality as 
given. An alternative view is that high audit quality can lead to high financial statement 
comparability which becomes an audit outcome. Besides, the comparability of earnings outputs 
among peer firms is likely to be influenced by auditors. As argued by Kothari et al. (2010), 
auditors are likely to have detailed working rules for routine interpretation and implementation 
of specific accounting standards and for compliance with GAAP more generally and with GAAS 
as well.   
Audit effort and audit outcomes are jointly determined along characteristics of the 
information environment and client riskiness.  Auditability is associated with company‟s 
financial reporting behavior; Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) document that large accruals are 
found to be positively associated with subsequent audit failures and auditor litigation. Moreover, 
Caramanis and Lennox (2008) find a positive relationship between audit hours (an observable 
                                                          
37
 The main tests in previous section show that there is negative relation between audit effort and comparability, and 
also a positive relation between audit quality and comparability. One may argue that audit fees (proxy for audit 
effort) and audit quality are positively related. For example, insights from the behavioral auditing literature (e.g., 
McDaniel 1990; Asare et al. 2000) predict that fee and time pressures reduce audit quality by causing auditors to 
“cut corners”, i.e., auditor may respond to these pressures by “cutting corners” on the audit with a corresponding 
reduction in audit scope and loss in audit quality. In light of this, a simultaneous equation estimation incorporating 
audit fees and audit quality is necessary to test the interplay of comparability with them and the validity of test 
results from single-equation models. 
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measure of audit effort) and abnormal accruals (especially income-increasing earnings 
management) even after controlling for endogeneity. Thus their results suggest that auditors 
might have to work harder if they believe that their clients are attempting to manage earnings.  
Controlling for endogeneity, I have accounting comparability simultaneously in the audit 
effort (audit fees) model and in the audit outcome model (whether comparability leads to higher 
audit quality or vice versa). I also add a variety of controls in the simultaneous equation system. 
They mostly are included in the main analysis as of single equation estimation in previous 
section. I address the endogeneity issue using 2SLS (two-stage least squares) analysis, 
simultaneous determination of accounting comparability, audit pricing, and audit quality.  
The first equation of audit fee model is the mostly same as the equation (5-2) for the main 
analysis. Caramanis and Lennox (2008) add prior-year audit hours as an instrumental variable; 
they reason that audit hours are highly persistent over time, making the previous year‟s hours a 
powerful predictor of the current year‟s hours. Even though, audit hours are endogenous and, as 
a priori, it is unclear in which direction endogeneity might bias the results (Hansen and Watts 
1997). I control prior year‟s audit fees as a control in the first equation (6-5). The second 
equation (6-6) is auditing quality regressing on accounting comparability. I add audit fees as a 
control for likely controlling economic bonding between client and auditor (Larcker and 
Richardson 2004). The third equation (6-7) captures that comparability is potentially the 
outcome of high audit quality. I estimate the following system of equations: 
 
                              
                                                
                                                                               
                                                                             
                                                                                                                     (6-5)                                             
 
                                 
                      
                     
                                                                            




                  
                                                          
                                                                                




Table 15 reports the results of the simultaneous equation estimation. I estimate the system 
of equations by year using two-stage least square and average the coefficients across years. For 
simplicity, I focus the discussion on the variable of interest in audit fees. Consistent with the 
main analysis, the coefficient on Comp
Acct
 is negative and significant at the 5% level (coefficient 
= -0.020) which suggests that high accounting comparability contributes to less audit effort. The 
coefficient of Comp
Acct
 on PMACA proxy for audit quality in the second equation (6-6) is 
negative and significant at the 5% level (coefficient = -0.051) which suggests that high 
comparability helps auditor contain discretionary accruals management. Overall, I conclude that 
the negative association between audit effort and accounting comparability does not appear to be 

















                                                          
38
 There are some limitations in this study. One obvious limitation is to differentiate whether accounting 
comparability is the result of high audit production by Big-N audits, or comparability of client firm promotes audit 
quality. The main limitation is the failure to find strong and valid instrumental variables as this can skew the results 
of the 2SLS models. Therefore, most of the results are interpreted from the OLS models and thus the endogeneity 
problem is not entirely controlled. 
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TABLE 15  
Simultaneous Equation Analysis 
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Export 1.512
***
   
SEG 0.070
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ISSUE -0.098
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Tenure   0.009
**
 
PMACA   -0.068
***
 
SPEC   0.087
***
 
First Stage R2  0.397 0.250 0.357 




(Footnote of Table 12 continues): 
Table 15 presents the results of the three equations estimated simultaneously. The system is annually estimated by 
two-stage least squares and then averaged across time. The standard errors are based on the times-series distribution 
of the annual estimates. *, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, 1% levels of significance, respectively. The dependent 
variable for the first equation is audit fees (FEE). The dependent variable in the second equation is performance-
matched abnormal current accruals (PMACA). The dependent variable of the third equation is accounting 
comparability (Comp
Acct
).  The sample has 20,750 observations during 2000-2009. The parameters of intercept 
effect, year and industry dummies are omitted for brevity.  Refer to the Appendix I for variable description. 
 
6.5. Other Additional Tests  
An increase in the likelihood of an auditor‟s issuing a going-concern opinion to a 
company that subsequently does not file bankruptcy (i.e., Type I error) can be reflective of a 
decrease in auditor competence. While this issue is probably less important than the opposite 
problem (Type II error), Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) focus on bankrupt companies, so they 
are unable to infer the effect of auditor tenure on Type I errors. An earlier study by Carcello and 
Neal (2000) considers the relationship between auditor tenure and audit reports for financially 
distressed companies but does not specifically address the issue of whether auditor tenure affects 
auditor Type I error rates. Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) extend Geiger and Raghunandan 
(2002) and Carcello and Neal (2000) by examining the nature of auditor decision errors for a 
nonbankrupt sample, they document that there is a weak relation between auditor tenure and the 
ability of predicting bankruptcy.
39
  
Extrapolating from prior literature on the association between auditor tenure and audit 
opinion, I partition the sample based on the audit tenure (more than 3 year or not) to examine 
whether accounting comparability is helpful for short-term auditing firms with their judgmental 
competence. Besides, the issue of endogeneity is more likely to be a problem if audit firm tenure 
is short (Myers et al. 2003). I separate the length of auditor tenure and test whether financial 
                                                          
39
 Using a sample of stressed bankrupt companies and stressed nonbankrupt companies in Belgium, the results by 
Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) indicate that auditors do not become less independent over time nor do they 




statement comparability is more helpful for auditor with a short-term auditor relative to a long-
term tenure in the auditor‟s professional judgment of business viability. I expect that accounting 
comparability is more important for new auditor to help improve her/his ability to discern when a 
company is truly at risk of entering bankruptcy and to express an accurate audit opinion.  
The portioned sample has 5,188 observations of clients with no more than three-year 
auditor tenure, and 15,562 observations of client with greater than three-year audit tenure 
duration.
40
 Using the ordered probit model, I employ the model equation (5-5) to examine the 
relationship between accounting comparability (Comp
Acct
) and auditor report accuracy 
(Accuracy) for clients with different length of auditor tenure.
41
 The results reported in Table 16 
reveal that Comp
Acct
 coefficients are positive and statistically significant in both short and long 
tenure samples (coefficient = 0.022 and 0.016, respectively). More importantly, the difference of 
Comp
Acct
 coefficients (positive 0.006) is statistically significant at the 5% level. Like in the main 
analysis, Big-N audits do not show an improved judgmental competence of issuing a going-
concern opinion (evidenced by the insignificant coefficient of BigN in the pooled or partitioned 
sample).
42
 Overall, the results suggest that industry-setting accounting comparability is 
particularly useful for new auditor in assessing the business risk and issuing a going-concern 
audit report. 
 In this subsection I discuss several other additional tests, the results, untabulated, remain 
statistically unaltered, relative to the results from the primary analyses:  
                                                          
40
 I arbitrarily assume the cut-off three-year auditor tenure is a short client-auditor relationship. The partition is 
accordance with a quartile value, 25% of the sample observations are with no more than auditor tenure duration.  
41
 Since I use tenure variable to partition the sample, control variable Tenure is dropped from equation (5-5) in this 
test. 
42
 I also add firm age (AGE) as a control variable for the regression. When I exclude the control for firm age, the 
results about the difference of coefficients on comparability (Comp
Acct
) for long or short auditor tenure remain 
qualitatively same.  
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a) I drop client firms with merger and acquisition activities because accruals for firms undergone 
these activities tend to be larger for reasons unrelated to earnings management (Ashbaugh et al. 
2003). I drop firms engaged in an M&A or other corporate restructuring activity as indicated in 
the Compustat footnote. Alternatively, I add a dummy of 1 if the company engaged in these 
activities, else 0; 
b) Except external audit, I also consider other external monitoring mechanism (institutional 
ownership, analysts coverage, and greater takeover threat) following Kim et al. (2011);  
c) I exclude client firms in financial sector (2-digit SIC code between 60 and 69) since financial 
institutions have fundamentally different operating characteristics and reporting behavior;  
d) Bhojraj et al. (2003) point out that the definition of industry at the two-digit SIC code is 
imperfect. Consequently, I re-estimate the comparability measures using the Fama-French (1997) 
definitions of 48 industry classifications.  
e) Cooper and Cordeiro (2008) document that practitioners generally use a small number of 
closely comparable firms (four to six) to estimate valuation multiples for investment purpose. 
They find that it is generally better to use a few closely comparable firms in the same industry, 
and that considering more firms simply adds noise. Auditor, perhaps, also uses a small group of 
peer clients for information comparability. Therefore, I replace the average of the top six highest 
comparability measures with industry-wide average comparability measure; 








TABLE 16  





≤ 3 years 
Auditor Tenure 



























































































































































Observation  20,750 5,188 15,562  
 Aldrich-Nelson 
Goodness of Fit 0.278 0.280 0.267 
 
The results are based on the ordered Probit regression of the model equation (5-5). The dependent variable is audit 
report accuracy (Accuracy). ***, **, * indicates that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, 
10% level of significance. Estimates on year dummies and industry dummies are not reported for brevity. Refer to 
Appendix I for all variable definitions.  
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7.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this study is to examine the usefulness of an under-researched 
accounting quality – comparability for the auditor-client relationship. Specifically, I investigate 
how accounting comparability affects the overall quality and perceived riskiness of external 
audit. Comparability enables auditors to identify similarities and differences of how client firms‟ 
economic events are translated into accounting results over time and across clients. Industry-wise 
comparability can provide efficiency and knowledge spillovers achieved by a single firm in audit 
engagement (Simunic 1984). I expand this framework that comparability reflects low audit risk 
from inherent client business riskiness per se and provides a positive externality gain for multiple 
audit engagements.  
The framework offers the following prediction: Comparability is positively associated 
with the timeliness of audit production, a reduced level of audit effort, and improved audit 
opinion accuracy. Empirical tests indicate that accounting comparability is systemically 
associated with audit efficiency and accuracy. I find that accounting comparability is positively 
related to audit quality (smaller magnitude of abnormal accruals, more accurate analyst forecasts 
of earnings, and lower implied cost of capital), and the audit opinion accuracy, and that 
comparability is negatively related to financial restatement, audit delay, audit pricing, and the 
likelihood of auditor‟s issuing a going-concern opinion.  
This study is important in advancing our understanding of the accounting quality of 
comparability. An auditee with a higher degree of information comparability is associated with 
lower level of business risk, and at the same time, information comparability contributes to 
externality gains that result in audit efficiency. The dual effects of comparability that is 
associated with 1) less audit fees and more informative earnings, bring benefits to auditees; 2) 
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more timely and accurate audit reporting, less audit failure, bring benefits to auditors as well. 
Given the role of externalities in expanding auditors‟ available information set, the study of intra-
industry information transfers in audit engagements provides additional insights on the economic 
benefits of audit accuracy and audit efficiency.  
Notwithstanding the above results, some caveats follow. One limitation is that I use 
aggregate net income / cash flows as the only accounting result for comparability, which 
captures only one dimension of the financial statements. I suggest that future studies create 
multi-dimensional measures of financial statement comparability, considering the cross-sectional 
differences in firms‟ production functions, business models, and accounting systems. 
Professional auditing standards require auditors to assess the risk of misstatement at the assertion 
level for each significant account balance or class of transactions. Future research can consider 
the role of comparability in account level and/or in auditor‟s materiality tests. Other necessary 
concerns this study omits are, for instance, 1) whether quality audits promote accounting 
comparability across client firms; 2) whether comparability matters more or less to a specialist 
auditor who has more clients in the same industry where there are economies of scale; 3) whether 
the use of computerized audit techniques weaken or strengthen the role of comparability, etc.  
Auditability should be largely affected by auditee‟s characteristics, e.g., financial 
reporting practices, transparency of corporate environment, and the forthrightness of 
management who interacts with auditor. I have added many business risk factors as controls and 
conducted analyses for different tests, the results remain strong. Still, one caveat of the paper is 
that some risks from client side may be omitted from the analyses, e.g., corporate governance 
metrics (of audit committee and many other multi-faceted governance proxies) are not included.  
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Besides, I must rely upon proxies for audit quality and audit effort since neither construct 
is directly observable. While random measurement error in the constructs merely dilutes the 
power of tests, any systematic association between measurement error in my audit quality 
proxies and audit outcome proxies potentially can yield misleading inferences. I have no reason 
to suspect the existence of a systematic pattern in measurement error, but neither can I rule out 
this possibility. Second, the tests are based on cross-sectional regressions and, as such, the 
direction of causality cannot be inferred. In particular, it is possible that large auditing firms and 
long auditor tenure may tend to push financial statement comparability, even though I implement 
“changes model” analysis and endogeneity tests to support the results from the main analyses. 
Potentially, future research could revisit the issue using an across-time design that might be more 
effective in isolating the direction of causality. Finally, behavior studies addressing how auditors 
use industry-setting comparable information are very necessary to complement the empirical 















Accounting Principles Board. 1970. Statement No. 4, Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles 
Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises. New York: Accounting Principles 
Board. 
Alford, A.W. 1992. The effect of the set of comparable firms on the accuracy of the price-
earnings valuation method. Journal of Accounting Research 30 (1): 94-108. 
Altman, E.I. 1983. Corporate financial distress: A complete guide to predicting, avoiding and 
dealing with bankruptcy. Toronto: Wiley & Sons. 
Anthony, J.H., and K. Ramesh.1992. Association between accounting performance measures and 
stock prices: A test of the life cycle hypothesis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 15: 203-
227. 
Antle, R., E. Gordon, G. Narayanamoorthy, and L. Zhou. 2006. The joint determination of audit 
fees, non-audit fees, and abnormal accruals. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 27 
(3): 235-266.  
Antle, R., and B. Nalebuff. 1991. Conservatism and auditor-client negotiations. Journal of 
Accounting Research 29 (Supplement): 31-54. 
Arens, A., R. Elder, and M. Beasley. 2004. Auditing and Assurance Services: An Integrated 
Approach. Tenth Edition. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Asare, S., G. Trompeter, and A. Wright.  2000. The effect of accountability and time budgets on 
auditors‟ testing strategies judgments. Contemporary Accounting Research 17 (4): 539-560.  
Ashbaugh, H., R. LaFond, and B.W. Mayhew. 2003. Do nonaudit services compromise auditor 
independence? Further evidence. The Accounting Review 78: 611-639. 
Ashton, R.H., J.J. Willingham, and R.K. Elliott. 1987. An empirical analysis of audit delay. 
Journal of Accounting Research 25 (2): 275-292. 
Ashton, R.H., P.R. Graul, and J.D. Newton. 1989. Audit delay and the timeliness of corporate 
reporting. Contemporary Accounting Research 5 (2): 657-673.  
Ball, R., S.P. Kothari, and A. Robin. 2000. The effect of international institutional factors on 
properties of accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29: 1-51.   
Ball, R., S.P. Kothari, and A. Robin. 2003. Incentives versus standards: Properties of accounting 
income in four East Asian countries. Journal of Accounting and Economics 36: 235-270. 
Balsam, S., J. Krishnan, and J. Yang. 2003. Auditor industry specialization and earnings quality. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 22: 71-97. 
86 
 
Balzer, W., and L. Slusky. 1992. Halo and performance appraisal research: A critical 
examination.  Journal of Applied Psychology 77 (6): 975-985. 
Bamber, E.M., L.S. Bamber, and M.P. Schoderbek. 1993. Audit structure and other determinants 
of audit report lag: An empirical analysis. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 12 (1): 1-23. 
Barth, M.E., D.P. Cram, and K.K. Nelson. 2001. Accruals and the prediction of future cash 
flows. The Accounting Review 76: 27-58. 
Barth, M.E., W.R. Landsman, M.H. Lang, and C.D. Williams. 2001. Are IFRS-based and US 
GAAP-based accounting amounts comparable? Working paper. Stanford University, University 
of North Carolina, and University of Michigan.  
Beasley, M.S., and K. Petroni. 2001. Board independence and audit firm type. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory 20: 97-114. 
Beaver, W.H.  1968. The information content of annual earnings announcements, empirical 
research in accounting: Selected studies. Journal of Accounting Research 6: 67-92. 
Beaver, W.H. 1981.  Financial reporting:  An accounting revolution. Prentice-Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., 1981. 
Becker, C.L., M.L. DeFond, J.J. Jiambalvo, and K.R. Subramanyam. 1998. The effect of audit 
quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research 15: 1-24 
Behn, B.K, J.H. Choi, and T. Kang. 2008. Audit quality and properties of analyst earnings 
forecasts. The Accounting Review 83 (2): 327-359. 
Behn, B.K, S.E. Kaplan, and K.R. Krumwiede. 2001. Further evidence on the auditor‟s going-
concern report: The influence of management plans. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 
20 (1): 13-29. 
Bell, T., M.E. Peecher, and I. Solomon. 2005. The 21
st
 Century Public Company Audit. New 
York, NY: KPMG LLP. 
Benston, G., M. Bromwich, and A. Wagenhofer. 2006. Principles- versus rules-based accounting 
standards: The FASB standard setting strategy. Abacus 42 (2): 165-188.  
Beyer, A., and S. Sridhar. 2006. Effects of multiple clients on the reliability of audit reports. 
Journal of Accounting Research 44 (1): 29-51. 
Bhojraj, S., and C.M.C. Lee. 2002. Who is my peer? A valuation-based approach to the selection 
of comparable firms. Journal of Accounting Research 40 (2): 407-439. 
Bhojraj, S., C.M.C. Lee, and D.K. Oler. 2003. What‟s my line? A comparison of industry 




Biddle, G.C., G. Hilary, and R.S. Verdi. 2009. How does financial reporting quality relate to 
investment efficiency? Journal of Accounting and Economics 48 (2-3): 112-131. 
Bloomfield, R. 2002. The “incomplete revelation hypothesis” and financial reporting. 
Accounting Horizons 16: 233-243. 
Bradshaw, M.T., Miller, G.S., and S.J. Serafeim. 2011. Accounting  method  heterogeneity  and 
analysts‟ forecasts. Working paper, Boston College, University of Michigan, and Harvard 
Business School. 
Bruynseels, L., W.R. Knechel, and M. Willekens. 2011. Auditor differentiation, mitigating 
management actions, and audit-reporting accuracy for distressed firms. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory 30 (1): 1-20. 
Callen, J. L., M. Khan, and H. Lu. 2012. Accounting quality, stock price delay and future stock 
returns. Contemporary Accounting Research, forthcoming. 
Caramanis, C., and C. Lennox. 2008. Audit effort and earnings management. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 45 (1): 116-138. 
Carcello, J.V., and T.L. Neal. 2000. Audit committee composition and auditor reporting. The 
Accounting Review 75 (4): 453-467. 
Carcello, J.V., and T.L. Neal. 2003. Audit committee characteristics and auditor dismissals 
following “new” going-concern reports. The Accounting Review 78 (1): 95-117.  
Carcello, J.V., and Z-V. Palmrose. 1994. Auditor litigation and modified reporting on bankrupt 
clients. Journal of Accounting Research 32 (Supplement): 1-30. 
CFA Institute Center. 2008. June survey where do you stand? Results on auditors.  
Charlottesville, VA: CFA Institute.  
Chambers, A.E., and S.H. Penman. 1984. Timeliness of reporting and stock price reaction to 
earnings announcements. Journal of Accounting Research 22: 21-47.  
Chan, L., J. Lakonishok, and B. Swaminathan. 2007. Industry classifications and return 
comovement. Financial Analyst Journal 63 (6): 56-70. 
Chaney, P., D. Jeter, and L. Shivakumar. 2004. Self-selection of auditors and audit pricing in 
private firms. The Accounting Review 79 (1): 51-72. 
Chen, S., S.Y.J. Sun, and D. Wu. 2010. Client importance, institutional improvements, and audit 
quality in China: An office and individual auditor level analysis. The Accounting Review 85: 
127-158.  
Cheng, C.S.A., and R. McNamara. 2000. The valuation accuracy of the price-earnings and price-




Cheng, C.S.A., and H. Zhang. 2011. The effect of earnings comparability on the informativeness 
of earnings smoothing. Working paper, Louisiana State University.  
Choy, A.K., and R.R. King. 2005. An experimental investigation of approaches to audit decision 
making: An evaluation using systems-mediated mental models, Contemporary Accounting 
Research 22 (2): 311-350.  
Christie, A., and J.L. Zimmerman. 1994. Efficient and opportunistic choices of accounting 
procedures: Corporate control contests. The Accounting Review 69 (4): 539-566. 
Chung, H., and S. Kallapur. 2003. Client importance, nonaudit services, and abnormal accruals. 
The Accounting Review 78: 931-955. 
Cooper, I., and L. Cordeiro. 2008. Optimal equity valuation using multiples: The number of 
comparable firms. Working paper, London Business School. 
Craswell, A., J. Francis, and S. Taylor. 1995. Auditor brand name reputations and industry 
specializations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20: 297-322. 
Cushing, B. 1989. Discussion of the association between audit technology and audit delay.  
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory (Supplement): 38-47. 
Dao, M., K. Raghunandan, and D.V. Rama. 2012. Shareholder voting on auditor selection, audit 
fees, and audit quality. The Accounting Review, forthcoming.   
Davies, B., and G.P. Whittred. 1980. The association between selected corporate attributes and 
timeliness in corporate reporting: Further analysis. Abacus 16 (1): 48-60.  
Davis, L.R., D.N. Ricchiute, and G. Trompeter. 1993. Audit effort, audit fees, and the provision 
of nonaudit services to audit clients. The Accounting Review 68 (1): 135-150. 
De Franco, G., S.P. Kothari, and R.S. Verdi. 2011. The benefits of financial statement 
comparability. Journal of Accounting Research 49 (4): 895-931.   
DeAngelo, L. 1981. Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 3: 
183-199. 
Dechow, P.M., and I. Dichev. 2002. The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual 
estimation errors. The Accounting Review 77 (4): 35-59.  
DeFond. M., Hu, X., Hung, M., and S. Li. 2011. The impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on 
foreign mutual fund ownership: The role of comparability. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 51(3): 240-258.  
DeFond, M.L., and M. Hung. 2003. An empirical analysis of analysts‟ cash flow forecasts. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 35 (1): 73-100. 
89 
 
DeFond, M.L., and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt covenant effects and the manipulation of accruals. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (1): 145-176. 
DeFond, M.L., and K.R. Subramanyam. 1998. Auditor changes and discretionary accruals. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 25 (1): 35-67. 
Dunn, K.A., and B.W. Mayhew. 2004. Audit firm industry specialization and client disclosure 
quality. Review of Accounting Studies 9: 35-58. 
Dye, R. 1993. Auditing standards, legal liability and auditor wealth. Journal of Political 
Economy 101: 887-914. 
Dyer, J.C., and A.J. McHugh. 1975. The timeliness of the Australian annual report. Journal of 
Accounting Research 13 (2): 204-220.  
Eilifsen, A., W.R. Knechel, and P. Wallage. 2001. Application of the business risk audit model: 
A field study. Accounting Horizons 15 (3): 193-207. 
Engelberg, J., A. Ozoguz, and S. Wang. 2010. Know thy neighbor: Industry cluster, information 
spillover and market efficiency. Working Paper, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
Erickson, M., and B.W. Mayhew. 2000. Why do audits fail? Evidence from Lincoln Savings and 
Loan, Journal of Accounting Research 38 (1): 165-194. 
Ettredge, M., D. Simon, D.B. Smith, and M. Stone. 2000. Would switching to timely reviews 
delay quarterly and annual earnings releases? Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 14 
(2):111-130. 
Fairfield, P., S. Ramnath, and T.L. Yohn. (2009). Do industry-level analyses improve forecasts 
of financial performance? Journal of Accounting Research 47 (1): 147-178. 
Fama, E.F., and K.R. French. 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on bonds and stocks. 
Journal of Financial Economics 33: 3-56. 
Fama, E.F., and K.R. French. 1996. Multifactor explanations of asset pricing anomalies. The 
Journal of Finance 51: 55-84. 
FASB. 1980. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2: Qualitative Characteristics of 
Accounting Information. Available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con2.pdf  
Ferguson, A., J.R. Francis, and D.J. Stokes. 2003. The effects if firm-wide and office-level 
industry expertise on audit pricing. The Accounting Review 78: 429-448. 
Francis, J., R. LaFond, P. Olson, and K. Schipper. 2005. The market pricing of accruals quality. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 39 (2): 295-327.  
90 
 
Francis, J., P. Olsson, and D. Oswald. 2000. Comparing the accuracy and explainability of 
dividend, free cash flow, and abnormal earnings equity value estimates. Journal of Accounting 
Research 38: 45-70. 
Francis, J., and K. Schipper. 1999. Have financial statement lost their relevance? Journal of 
Accounting Research 37: 319-352.  
Francis, J.R., and J. Krishnan. 1999. Accounting accruals and auditor reporting conservatism. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 16: 135-165. 
Francis, J.R., E.L. Maydew, and H.C. Sparks. 1999. The role of Big 6 auditors in the credible 
reporting of accruals. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 18: 17-34. 
Francis, J.R., K. Reichelt, and D. Wang. 2005. The pricing of national and city-specific 
reputations for industry expertise in the U.S. audit market. The Accounting Review 80: 113-126. 
Francis, J.R. 2011. A framework for understanding and researching audit quality. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory 30 (2): 125-152. 
Frankel, R.M., M.F. Johnson, and K.K. Nelson. 2002. The relation between auditors‟ fees for 
nonaudit services and earnings management. The Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 71-105.  
Geiger, M.A., and D.S. North. 2006. Does hiring a new CFO change things? An investigation of 
changes in discretionary accruals. The Accounting Review 81 (4): 781-809. 
Geiger, M.A., and K. Raghunandan. 2001. Bankruptcies, audit reports, and the Reform Act. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 20 (1): 187-195. 
Geiger, M.A., and K. Raghunandan. 2002. Auditor tenure and audit reporting failures. Auditing: 
A Journal of Practice & Theory 21 (1): 67-80. 
Geiger, M.A., K. Raghunandan, and D.V. Rama. 1998. Costs associated with going-concern 
modified audit opinions: An analysis of auditor changes, subsequent opinions, and client failures. 
Advances in Accounting 16: 117-139.  
Geiger, M.A., K. Raghunandan, and D.V. Rama. 2005. Recent changes in the association 
between bankruptcies and prior audit opinions. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 24 (1): 
21-35. 
Geiger, M.A., and D.V. Rama. 2003. Audit fees, nonaudit fees, and auditor reporting on stressed 
companies. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 22: 53-69. 
Geiger, M.A., and D.V. Rama. 2006. Audit firm size and going-concern reporting accuracy. 
Accounting Horizons 20 (1): 1-17. 
Givoly, D.M., and D. Palmon. 1982. Timeliness of annual earnings announcements: Some 
empirical evidence. The Accounting Review 57 (3): 486-508.  
91 
 
Gode, D., and P. Mohanram. 2003. Inferring the cost of capital using the Ohlson-Juettner model. 
Review of Accounting Studies 8 (4):399-431.  
Gong, G., L.Y. Li, and L. Zhou. 2012. Earnings non-synchronicity and voluntary disclosure. 
Contemporary Accounting Research: forthcoming. 
Gow, I.D., G. Ormazabal, and D.J. Taylor. 2010. Correcting for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence in accounting research. The Accounting Review 85 (2): 483-512. 
Gul, F.A., S.Y.K. Fung, and B. Jaggi. 2009. Earnings quality: Some evidence on the role of 
auditor tenure and auditors‟ industry expertise. Journal of Accounting and Economics 47: 265-
287.  
Gunny, K., and T. Zhang. 2009. PCAOB inspection reports and audit quality. Working paper, 
University of Colorado and Singapore Management University. 
Hail, L., C. Leuz, and P. Wysocki. 2009. Global accounting convergence and the potential 
adoption of IFRS by the United States: An analysis of economic and policy factors. Working 
paper, University of Pennsylvania.  
Hameed, A., R. Morck, J. Shen, and B. Yeung. 2010. Information, analysts, and stock 
comovement. Working paper, National University of Singapore.  
Hansen, S.C., and J.S. Watts. 1997. Two models of the auditor-client interaction: Tests with 
United Kingdom data. Contemporary Accounting Research 14: 23-50. 
Hopwood, W., J.C. McKeown, and J.F. Mutchler. 1994. A reexamination of auditor versus 
model accuracy within the context of the going-concern opinion decision. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 10 (2): 409-431. 
Hou, K., M.A. Van Dijk, and Y. Zhang. 2012. The implied cost of capital: A new approach. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming.  
Houston, R.W., M.F. Peters, and J.H. Pratt. 1999. The audit risk model, business risk and audit-
planning decisions. The Accounting Review 74 (3): 281-298. 
Hribar, P., and D. Collins. 2002. Errors in estimating accruals: Implications for empirical 
research. Journal of Accounting Research 40 (1): 105-134. 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). 2008. Handbook of international auditing, 
assurance, and ethics pronouncements – Part I. New York, NY: IFAC. 
Jenkins, D.S., G.D., Kane, and U. Velury. 2006. Earnings quality decline and the effect of 
industry specialist auditors: An analysis of the late 1990s. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 25 (1): 71-90. 
Jones, J. 1991. Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting 
Research 29 (2): 193-228. 
92 
 
Joos, P., and M. Lang. 1994. The effects of accounting diversity: Evidence from the European 
Union. Journal of Accounting Research 32: 141-168.  
Khurana, I., and K. Raman. 2004. Litigation risk and the financial reporting credibility of Big 4 
versus non-Big 4 audits: Evidence from Anglo-American countries. The Accounting Review 79 
(2): 473-495. 
Kim, Y., and S. Li. 2010. Mandatory IFRS adoption and intra-industry information transfer. 
Working paper, Santa Clara University.  
Kim, J., Y. Li, and L. Zhang. 2011. Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: Firm-
level analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 100: 639-662. 
Kim, J., X. Liu, and L. Zheng. 2010. Does mandatory IFRS adoption impact audit fees? Theory 
and evidence. Working paper, City University of Hong Kong.  
Kini, O., S. Mian, M. Rebello, and A. Venkateswaran. 2009. On the structure of analyst 
research portfolios and forecast accuracy. Journal of Accounting Research 47 (4): 867-909.  
Kinney, W.R.,Jr., and L.S. McDaniel. 1993. Audit delay for firms correcting quarterly earnings. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 12 (2): 135-142.  
Knapp, M.C. 1985. Audit conflict: An empirical study of the perceived ability of auditors to 
resist management pressure. The Accounting Review 60: 202-211.  
Knechel, W.R., and J.L. Payne. 2001. Additional evidence on audit report lag. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory 20 (1): 137-146. 
Knechel, W.R., S. Salterio, and B. Ballou. 2007. Auditing: Assurance and Risk. 3
rd
 edition. 
Cincinnati, OH: South-Western College Publishing. 
Knechel, R.W., and A. Vanstraelen. 2007. The relationship between auditor tenure and audit 
quality implied by going concern opinions. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 26 (1): 
113-131. 
Kothari, S.P., A.J. Leone, and C.E. Wasley. 2005. Performance matched discretionary accrual 
measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39 (1): 163-197.  
Kothari, S.P., J.W. Lewellen, and J.B. Warner. 2006. Stock returns, aggregate earnings surprises, 
and behavioral finance. Journal of Financial Economics 79: 537-568. 
Kothari, S.P., K., Ramanna, and D. Skinner. 2010. Implications for GAAP from an analysis of 
positive research in accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50: 246-286. 
Krishnan, G. 2003. Audit quality and the pricing of discretionary accruals. Auditing: A Journal 
of Practice & Theory 22 (1): 109-126. 
93 
 
Krishnan, G., 2003. Does Big 6 auditor industry expertise constrain earnings management? 
Accounting Horizons (Supplement): 1-16. 
Krishnan, G., and W. Yu. 2011. Further evidence on knowledge spillover and the joint 
determination of audit and non-audit fees. Managerial Auditing Journal 26 (3): 230-247. 
Krishnan, J., and J. Krishnan. 1997. Litigation risk and auditor resignations. The Accounting 
Review 72 (4): 539-560. 
Kopp, L.S. and E. O‟Donnell. 2005. The influence of a business-process focus on category 
knowledge and internal control evaluation. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 30 (5): 423-
434.  
Kross, W., and D.A. Schroeder. 1984. An empirical investigation of the effect of quarterly 
earnings announcement timing on stock returns.  Journal of Accounting Research 22 (1): 153-
176.  
Land, M.H., and M. Lang. 2002. Empirical evidence on the evolution of international earnings. 
The Accounting Review 77 (supplement): 115-133.  
Lang, M., and R. Lundholm. 1996. Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior. The 
Accounting Review 71 (4): 467-492. 
Lang, M., M. Maffett, and E. Owens. 2010. Earnings comovement and accounting 
comparability: The effects of mandatory IFRS adoption. Working paper, University of North 
Carolina.  
Larcker, D.F., and S. Richardson. 2004. Fees paid to audit firms, accrual choices, and corporate 
governance. Journal of Accounting Research 42 (3): 625-658. 
Larcker, D.F., and T.O. Rusticus. 2010. On the use of instrumental variables in accounting 
research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 49 (3): 186-205.  
Lawrence, A., M., Minutti-Meza, and P. Zhang. 2011. Can big 4 versus non-big 4 differences in 
audit-quality proxies be attributed to client characteristics? The Accounting Review 86 (1): 259-
286. 
Lemon, M., K.W. Tatum, and W.S. Turley (2000) Developments in the Audit Methodologies of 
Large Accounting Firms. Hertford, U.K.: Stephen Austin & Sons, Ltd.  
Lennox, C. 1999. Are large auditors more accurate than small auditors? Accounting and Business 
Research 29 (3): 217-227. 
Lennox, C., and J.A. Pittman. Big Five audits and accounting fraud. Contemporary Accounting 
Research 27 (1): 209-247. 
Lim, C.Y., and H-T, Tan. 2008. Non-audit service fees and audit quality: The impact of auditor 
specialization. Journal of Accounting Research 46 (1): 199-246. 
94 
 
Lipe, M.G., and S.E. Salterio. 2000. The balanced scorecard: Judgmental effects of common and 
unique performance measures. The Accounting Review 75 (3): 283-298.  
Louwers, T.J. 1998. The relation between going-concern opinions and the auditor‟s loss 
function. Journal of Accounting Research 36 (1): 143-156. 
Low, K.Y. 2004. The effect of industry specialization on audit risk assessments and audit 
planning decisions. The Accounting Review 79 (1): 201-209.  
Mansi, S.A., Maxwell, W.F., and D.P., Miller. 2004. Does auditor quality and tenure matter to 
investors? Evidence from the bond market. Journal of Accounting Research 42 (4): 755-793. 
McDaniel, L. 1990. The effects of time pressure and audit program structure on audit 
performance. Journal of Accounting Research 28 (2): 267-285.  
McKeown, J.C., J.F. Mutchler, W. Hopwood, and T.B. Bell. 1991. Towards an explanation of 
audit failure to modify the audit opinion of bankruptcy companies. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory 10 (Supplement): 1-13. 
McNichols, M.F. 2002. Discussion of “The quality of accrual and earnings: The role of accrual 
estimation errors”. The Accounting Review 77 (supplement): 61-69. 
Meeks, G., and G. Swann. 2008. Accounting standards and the economics of standards. Working 
paper, University of Cambridge and University of Nottingham.  
Merton, R.C. 1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. 
The Journal of Finance 42: 483-510.  
Moroney, R., and P. Carey. 2011. Industry- versus task-based experience and auditor 
performance. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 30 (2): 1-18. 
Murphy, K., R. Jako, and R. Anhalt. 1993. Nature and consequences of halo error: A critical 
analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology 78 (2): 218-225. 
Mutchler, J.F., W. Hopwood, and J.M. McKeown. 1997. The influence of contrary information 
and mitigating factors on Audit Opinion Decisions on Bankrupt companies. Journal of 
Accounting Research 35 (2): 295-310.  
Myers, J.N., L.A., Myers, and T.C. Omer. 2003. Exploring the term of the auditor-client 
relationship and the quality of earnings: A case for mandatory auditor rotation. The Accounting 
Review 78: 779-799. 
Neal, T.L., and R.R. Riley Jr. 2004. Auditor industry specialist research design. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory 23 (2): 169-177. 
Newton, J.D., and R.H. Ashton. 1989. The association between audit technology and audit delay. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 8 (Supplement): 22-37. 
95 
 
Nisbett, R., and T. Wilson. 1977. The halo effect: Evidence for unconscious alteration of 
judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35 (4): 250-256. 
Nogler, G.E. 1995. The resolution of going concern opinions. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory 14 (2): 54-73. 
O‟Donnell, E., and J. Schultz. 2005. The halo effect in business risk audits: Can strategic risk 
assessment bias auditor judgment about accounting details? The Accounting Review 80 (3): 921-
938. 
O‟Keefe, T.B., R.D. King, and K.M. Gaver. 1994. Audit fees, industry specialization, and 
compliance with GAAS reporting standards. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 13: 41-
55. 
Ohlson, J.A. 1995. Earnings, book values, and dividends in equity valuation. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 11 (2): 661-687.  
Owhoso, V.E., W.F. Messier, Jr., and J.G. Lynch, Jr. 2002. Error detection by industry 
specialized teams during sequential audit review. Journal of Accounting Research 40: 883-900. 
Palmrose, Z-V. 1987. Litigation and independent auditors: The role of business failures and 
management fraud. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 6: 90-103. 
Palmrose, Z-V. 1988. An analysis of auditor litigation and audit service quality. The Accounting 
Review 63 (1): 55-73.  
Peecher, M., R., Schwartz, and I. Solomon. 2007. It‟s all about quality: Perspectives on strategic-
systems auditing. Accounting, Organizations and Society 32 (4-5): 463-486. 
Penman, S., and T. Sougiannis. 1998.  A comparison of dividend, cash flow, and earnings 
approaches to equity valuation. Contemporary Accounting Research 15: 343-383.  
Piotroski, J., and D. Roulstone. 2004. The influence of analysts, institutional investors, and 
insiders on the incorporation of market, industry, and firm-specific information into stock price. 
The Accounting Review 79 (4): 1119-1151. 
Rajgopal, S., D. Taylor, and M. Venkatachalam. 2011. Frictions in the CEO labor market: The 
role of talent agents in CEO compensation. Contemporary Accounting Research 15: 1-33. 
Ramnath, S. 2002. Investor and analyst reaction to earnings announcements of related firms: An 
empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 40 (5): 1345-1371.  
Reichelt, K.J., and D. Wang. 2010. National and office-specific measures of auditor industry 
expertise and effects on audit quality. Journal of Accounting Research 48 (3): 647-686. 
Revsine, L. 1985. Comparability: An analytic examination. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 4 (1): 1-12. 
96 
 
Ricchiute, D.N. 2010. Evidence complexity and information search in the decision to restate 
prior-period financial statements. Journal of Accounting Research 48 (3): 687-724. 
Richardson, S., I. Tuna, and P. Wysocki. 2010. Accounting anomalies and fundamental analysis: 
A review of recent research advances. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50 (2-3): 410-454.  
Schipper, K., and L. Vincent. 2003. Earnings quality. Accounting Horizons 17: 97-110. 
Schultz, J.J., J.L. Bierstaker, and E. O‟Donnell. 2010. Integrating business risk into auditor 
judgment about the risk of material misstatement: The influence of a strategic-systems-audit 
approach. Accounting, Organizations and Society 35 (2): 238-251. 
Seetharaman, A., F.A. Gul, and G.L. Stephen. 2002. Litigation risk and audit fees: Evidence 
from UK firms cross-listed on US markets. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33: 91-115.  
Shu, S. 2000. Auditor resignations: Clientele effects and legal liability. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 29 (2): 173-205. 
Simunic, D. 1980. The pricing of audit services: Theory and evidence. Journal of Accounting 
Research 18 (1): 161-190.  
Simunic, D. 1984. Auditing, consulting, and auditor independence. Journal of Accounting 
Research 22: 679-702. 
Simunic, D., and M.T. Stein. 1996. Impact of litigation risk on audit pricing: A review of the 
economics and the evidence. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 15: 119-134. 
Slovic, P., and D. MacPhillamy. 1974. Dimensional commensurability and cue utilization in 
comparative judgment. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 11 (2): 172-194. 
Sohn, B. 2011. The effect of accounting comparability on earnings management. Working paper, 
City University of Hong Kong. 
Solomon, I., M.D. Shields, and O.R. Whittington. 1999. What do industry-specialist auditors 
know? Journal of Accounting Research 37 (1): 191-208. 
Srinivasan, S. 2005. Consequences of financial reporting failure for outside directors: Evidence 
from accounting restatements and audit committee members. Journal of Accounting Research 43 
(2): 291-334. 
St. Pierre, K., and J.A. Anderson. 1984. An analysis of the factors associated with lawsuits 
against public accountants. The Accounting Review 59: 242-263. 
Stanley, J. D., and T. F. DeZoort. 2007. Audit firm tenure and financial restatements: An 




Stubben, S. 2010. Discretionary revenues as a measure of earnings management. The Accounting 
Review 85 (2): 695-717. 
Taylor, M. 2000. The effects of industry specialization on auditor‟s inherent risk assessments and 
confidence judgments. Contemporary Accounting Research 17 (4): 693-712.  
Teoh, S.H. 1992. Auditor independence, dismissal threats, and the market reaction to auditor 
switches. Journal of Accounting Research 30: 1-23. 
Teoh, S.H., and T. Wong. 1993. Perceived auditor quality and the earnings response coefficient. 
The Accounting Review 68 (2), 346-366.  
Watkins, A.L., W. Hillison, and S.E. Morecroft. 2004. Audit quality: A synthesis of theory and 
empirical evidence. Journal of Accounting Literature 23: 153-193.  
Weber, J., and M. Willenborg. 2003. Do expert informational intermediaries add value? 
Evidence from auditors in Microcap IPOs. Journal of Accounting Research 41 (4): 681-720. 
Whisenant, S., S. Sankaraguruswamy, and K. Raghunandan. 2003. Evidence on the joint 
determination of audit and nonaudit fees. Journal of Accounting Research 41 (4): 721-744.   
Wu, G.H. 2006. An economic analysis of audit and nonaudit services: The trade-off 
between competition crossovers and knowledge spillovers. Contemporary Accounting 
Research 23 (2): 527-554. 
Wu, S., and I.X. Zhang. 2011. Accounting integration and comparability: Evidence from 
relative performance evaluation around IFRS adoption. Working paper, University of 
Rochester and University of Minnesota. 
Wyatt, A. 2005. Accounting recognition of intangible assets: Theory and evidence on economic 



















The absolute value of the difference of the predicted value of a regression of firm 
i‟s earnings on firm i‟s return using the estimated coefficients for firms i and j 
respectively. It is calculated for each firm i – firm j pair, (i ≠ j), j = 1 to J firms in 
the same two-digit SIC industry as firm i. 
Comp
A5
 = The average of the five highest Comp
Acct
 values for firm i.   
Comp
Earn
  = 
The R
2
 from a regression of firm i‟s annual earnings on the annual earnings of 
firm j, controlling for accounting choice heterogeneity (ACH), over rolling 6 
years, is calculated for each firm i – firm j pair, (i ≠ j), j = 1 to J firms in the same  
two-digit SIC industry as firm i. A firm-level measure is calculated by taking the 
average of all the firm i – firm j measures. 
Comp
E5
 = The average of the five highest Comp
Earn
 values for firm i.  
Comp
CFO
  = 
The R
2
 from a regression of firm i‟s annual operating cash flows on the annual 
operating cash flows of firm j, over rolling 6 years, is calculated for each firm i – 
firm j pair, (i ≠ j), j = 1 to J firms in the same  two-digit SIC industry as firm i. A 




 = The average of the five highest Comp
CFO






 from a regression of firm i‟s quarterly cumulative returns on quarterly 
cumulative returns of firm j, over rolling 16 quarters, is calculated for each firm i 
– firm j pair, (i ≠ j), j = 1 to J firms in the same  two-digit SIC industry as firm i. 
A firm-level measure is calculated by taking the average of all the firm i – firm j 
measures. 
GCAO = 
A dummy variable, 1 if auditor issues a going-concern audit opinion, and 0 
otherwise. 
Accuracy = 
Auditor‟s opinion is accurate (Accuracy =1) if a going-concern is issued and the 
client subsequently occurs negative operating cash flow or negative book value, 
not accurate (Accuracy = ‒1) if a going-concern is not issued but the client 
subsequently occurs negative operating cash flows, or issued to subsequently 
viable clients (viability means, in the following year, 2 out 4 quarterly ROAs are 
positive, or annual ROA is nonnegative). Accuracy is 0 otherwise. 




A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the auditor is a joint city and national 
industry specialist following Reichelt and Wang (2010), based on their definition 
2 of industry market share (on p.656), 0 otherwise. 
BigN = 
An indicator variable equals to 1 if the auditor is a Big 4/5/6 auditor, and 0 
otherwise. 
Delay = 
The square root of the number of calendars days from fiscal year-end to the date 
of the auditor‟s report.  
PMACA = Performance-matched abnormal current accruals, following Francis et al. (2005). 
ICC = The ex ante cost of equity capital following Hou et al. (2012). 
AFA =  
Analysts forecast accuracy, the absolute value of the forecast error multiplied by -
100, scaled by the stock price at the end of the prior fiscal year, where the 
forecast error is the I/B/E/S analysts‟ mean  annual earnings forecast less the 
actual earnings as reported by I/B/E/S. 
 
Control Variables: 
SIZE = The natural log of market value of common equity at fiscal year-end. 
lnSales = The natural log of sales (in thousands of dollars). 
lnBM = The natural log of the ratio of book value to market value. 
ROA = Return on assets, net income before extraordinary items, scaled by lagged assets. 
L1ROA = Prior year return on assets. 
CashVol = 
The standard deviation of cash flows (OANCF–XIDOC), scaled by lagged assets, 
over rolling 6 years (requiring a minimum of four years of data to estimate). 
EP = 
Earnings persistence, regression of AR(1) model, over rolling 16 quarters 
(requiring a minimum of 8 quarters of data to estimate). 
LOSS = 
A dummy variable, 1 if net income before extraordinary items is negative, and 0 
otherwise. 
CI = 
Client importance, calculated as client i‟s total assets to the sum of the total assets 
of all the clients of an auditor j at the same year (Chen et al. 2010),      
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. 
LEV = 
Financial leverage, calculated as long term debt plus debt in current liabilities, 




The client‟s concentration of ownership. It is measured by natural logarithm of 
the client‟s number of common shares outstanding divided by the number of 
common shareholders. 
Altman = 
Altman (1983) Z score, measure of the probability of bankruptcy, with a lower 
value indicating greater financial distress, following, e.g., DeFond and Hung 
(2003); Rajgopal et al. (2011). 
LITI = 
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in a high-
litigation industry and 0 otherwise. High-litigation industries are industries with 
SIC codes 2833-2836 (Biotech), 3570-3577, 7370-7374 (computer), 3600-3674 
(electronics), 5200-5961 (retailing), following, e.g., Frankel et al. (2002) and 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003). 
TECH = 
An indicator variable equal to 1 when firm is in high technology industries (SIC 
code the 2830s, 3570s, 7370s, 8730s, and between 3825 and 3829), and 0 
otherwise. 
LEV = 
Financial leverage, calculated as long term debt plus debt in current liabilities, 
scaled by total assets. 
SalesG = Yearly sales growth. 
AGE = The inverse value of firm age based on the CRSP return data. 
CURR =  The current ratio, calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. 
Quick  = 
The quick ratio, calculated as current assets less inventory, scaled by current 
liabilities. 
Export = The ratio of foreign sales to total sales. 
SEG = Square root of the number of business segments.  
|SPI| = The absolute value of special items divided by total assets (|spi/at|). 
Tenure  = 
The number of consecutive years that firm i has retained the auditor since 1974 at 
year t. 
CFO = 
Annual cash flows from operations less cash flows from extraordinary items, 
(OANCF–XIDOC), following the approach in Hribar and Collins (2002), scaled 
by prior-year total assets; 
DCF = A dummy variable of CFO, if positive it is coded as 1, 0 otherwise.  




The absolute value of discretionary accruals scaled by lagged assets, calculated 
from the Kothari et al. (2005) performance-adjusted accruals model of Jones 
(1991). 
ISSUE = 
A dummy variable set equal to 1 when the client firm issued equity or long-term 
debt during the year that is greater than 5% of total assets. 
Restate = 1 if there is a subsequent financial restatement, 0 otherwise. 
ACH = Accounting choice heterogeneity following DeFond and Hung (2003). 
AudChg = 1 if there is the auditor change during the fiscal year, 0 otherwise.  
Beta = 
Stock beta (systematic risk) calculated over the 36 months ending in the month of 
the fiscal year-end. 
EXCH = 
1 if firm is listed on the New York or American Stock Exchange, and 0 
otherwise. 
UE = 
Unexpected earnings, measured as (net income at year t+1 – net income at year 
t)/market value of equity at the end of year t; 
FOL = The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following the client.  
Horizon  = 
The natural logarithm of the average number of calendar days between forecast 




















MEASURES OF IMPLIED COST OF CAPITAL 
 
Following Khurana and Raman (2004) and Lawrence et al. (2011), I use the ex ante cost-
of-equity capital to proxy for audit quality.  Hou et al. (2012) propose a new approach to estimate 
the implied cost of capital (ICC). The new approach is distinct from prior studies in what they do 
not rely on analysts‟ earnings forecast to compute the ICC. It is a cross-sectional model to 
forecast the earnings of individual firms. The approach enjoys two major advantages: 1) it allows 
estimating the ICC for a much larger sample of firms over a much longer time period; 2) it is not 
affected by the various issues that lead to well-documented biases in analysts‟ forecasts. 
According to Hou et al. (2012), the cross-sectional earnings model delivers earnings forecast that 
outperform consensus analysts forecast as they present evidence on the implications for the 
equity premium and a variety of asset pricing anomalies.  
I follow Hou et al. (2012) to compute firm-level ex ante cost of capital. I estimate the 
following pooled cross-sectional regressions using the previous ten years (three years minimum) 
of data: 
                                                                                 
where: 
Eit+τ  = Earnings of firm i in year t+ τ (τ = 1, 2, or 3); 
Vit = The market value of the firm; 
Ait = The total book assets; 
Dit  = The dividend payment; 
DDit = A dummy variable that equals 0 for dividend payers and 1 for non-payers; 
LOSSit = 




TAccit = The operating accruals (earnings less operating cash flows). 
 
All explanatory variables are measured at the end of year t. This model is also consistent 
with the fundamental forecasting framework proposed by Richardson et al. (2010). I use the 
model to forecast dollar earnings for the next three years. In addition, it is a common practice in 
the literature to use dollar earnings forecasts in the residual income model to estimate the ICC. 
That is to say, I am concerned about overweighting firms with extreme earnings in the 
regressions. To mitigate the influence of such observations, I winsorize earnings and other level 
variables each year at the 0.5% and 99.5% percentiles (observations beyond the extreme 
percentiles are set to equal to the values at those percentiles).
43
  
For each firm and each year t in the sample, I estimate expected earnings for year t+1, 
t+2, and t+3 (i.e., Et[Et+1], Et[Et+2], and Et[Et+3]) by multiplying the independent variables 
observed at the end of year t with the coefficients from the pooled regression estimated using the 
previous ten years (three years minimum) of data. This is to ensure that earnings forecasts are 
strictly out of sample (that is, all information that is required to forecast earnings for year t+1, 
t+2, and t+3 is available at the end of year t). Note that I only require a firm to have non-missing 
values for the independent variables for year t to calculate its earnings forecasts. As a result, the 
survivorship requirement is minimal.  
The ICC for a given firm is the internal rate of return that equates the current stock price 
to the present value of expected future cash flows. One common approach to estimate the ICC is 
to use the discounted residual income model, which has the following general form: 
                    ∑
                          
      
 
 
                                                                     (A-1)                                              
where: 
                                                          
43
 I also carry out robustness checks by scaling the earnings (and the other variables in the earnings regressions) 
using total assets, market equity, sales, or net operating assets and obtain similar results. 
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Pit = The stock price of firm i; 
Ri = The implied cost of equity capital (ICC); 
BPSit = The book equity per share; 
Et[] = Market expectation; 
ROE = The after-tax return on book equity; 
(ROEit+k – Ri) × BPSit+k-1 = 
The firm‟s residual income for year t+k, defined as the 
difference between the ROE and the ICC multiplied by 
book equity per share for the previous year. 
 
Intuitively, a firm‟s residual income measures its ability to earn income beyond that 
required by equity investors. Assuming “Clean Surplus” accounting, equation (A-1) is equivalent 
to the familiar dividend discount model.
44
 Previous studies (e.g., Penman and Sougiannis 1998; 
Francis et al. 2000; Gebhardt et al. 2001) argue that the residual income model does a better job 
in capturing the effect of economic profits on firm value, and the resulting valuation is less 
sensitive to assumptions about long-term growth rates. I compute the ICC as the cost of capital Ri 
that solves an adapted version of equation (A-1):  
                    ∑
                        
      
 
  
    
                        
         
                               (A-2)           
Equation (A-2) is identical to the model of Gebhardt et al. (2001), but expresses firm 
valuation in terms of market equity (Mit) and book equity (Bit) instead of stock price and book 
equity per share. In line with Gebhardt et al. (2001), I estimate expected ROE for year t+1 to t+3 
using the earnings forecasts from the cross-sectional model and book equity determined based on 
clean surplus accounting (Bit+τ = Bit+τ-1 + Eit+τ – Dit+τ, where Dit+τ is the dividend for year t+τ, 
computed using the current dividend payout ratio for firms with positive earnings, or using 
current dividends divided by 0.06 × total assets (Ait) as an estimate of the payout ratio for firms 
                                                          
44
 “Clean Surplus” accounting requires that all gains and losses affecting book equity are included in earnings.   
In other words, the change in book equity is equal to earnings minus net dividends (Ohlson 1995). 
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with negative earnings). After year t+3, I assume that the ROE mean-reverts to the historical 
industry median value by year t+11, after which point the residual income becomes perpetuity. 
As in Gebhardt et al. (2001), I exclude loss firms when calculating the industry median ROE.  
I estimate the ICC for each firm at the end of June of each calendar year t using the end-of-June 
market value and the earnings forecasts at the previous fiscal year end. I follow previous studies 
and discard negative ICC estimates. In addition, I winsorize the ICC estimates at the 0.5% and 
99.5% percentiles to minimize the impact of outliers. However, the main results are robust to 
relaxing the non-negativity restriction or removing the winsorization. I match the ICC estimates 


















MEASURES OF ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY 
 
More recently, Behn et al. (2008) include analyst forecast accuracy as an audit-quality 
proxy. They argue that if one type of auditor increases the reporting reliability of earnings in 
comparison to the other type, then, ceteris paribus, analysts of the superior type‟s clients should 
be able to make more accurate forecasts of future earnings than those analysts of the non-
superior type‟s clients. Using this reasoning, Behn et al. (2008) find that analysts of Big 4 clients 
have higher forecast accuracy than analysts of non-Big 4 clients. I use analyst forecast accuracy 
as the third audit quality measure to proxy for an enhanced level of decision making by 
sophisticated financial statement users. Lawrence et al. (2011) also use analyst forecast accuracy 
as an additional proxy for audit quality. 
In fact, the type of audit firms (e.g., Big 4 or non-Big 4) does not always differentiate 
audit quality. Anecdotal evidence according to a 2008 CFA Institute survey of 617 CFA 
investment analysts shows that the majority of analysts do not prefer Big 4 auditors to non-Big 4 
auditors. Specifically, only 41 percent of the respondents generally indicated that they had a 
preference for firms using “brand-name” auditors; moreover, only 15 percent of the respondents 
thought that the attractiveness of a company as an investment is detracted when a smaller 
company switches to a lower-cost auditor that may be more efficient and cost-effective (CFA 
Institute Center 2008).  
Forecast accuracy (AFAt) is measured by the negative of the absolute value of forecast 
error scaled by stock price at time t-1, following Lang and Lundholm (1996). I denote by 
         
    the mean I /B/E/S consensus forecast of period t earnings made during the period 
starting two months before the corresponding actual earnings announcement and ending three 
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days before the announcement; by EPSt I denote actual earnings per share before extraordinary 
items at time t, taken from I/B/E/S, and by PRICEt-1 the stock price at the end of period t-1. I 
remove the influence of stale forecasts by using only the most recent forecast for the calculation 
of the mean if an analyst announces multiple forecasts during the period. Then, forecast accuracy 
is defined as:  
                 
          
         
        
                                                               
 
Observations having AFA variable smaller than -1.5 (about 1% of the distribution in this 
study) are removed as outliers. The results are not sensitive to difference outlier control 
approaches. 
I also compute a slightly different measure of analyst forecast accuracy (AFA), the 
absolute value of the forecast error, following De Franco et al. (2011): 
                    
                             
         
                                                                
 
where Forecast EPSit is analysts‟ mean I/B/E/S forecast of firm-i‟s annual earnings for 
year t. For a given fiscal year (e.g., December of year t+1) I collect the earliest forecast available 
during the year (i.e., I use the earliest forecast from January to December of year t+1 for a 
December fiscal year-end firm). Actual EPSit is the actual amount announced by firm i for fiscal 
period t+1 as reported by I/B/E/S. PRICEit-1 is the stock price at the end of the prior fiscal year. 
Because the absolute forecast error is multiplied by -100, higher values of AFA imply more 
accurate forecasts. 
 I also measure optimism in analysts‟ forecasts (Optimism) using the singed forecast error:  
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